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Regulatory Monopoly and Differential 
Pricing in the Market for Patents 
Neel U. Sukhatme* 
Abstract 
Patents are limited-term monopolies awarded to inventors to 
incentivize innovation. But there is another monopoly that has 
been largely overlooked at the heart of patent law: the monopoly of 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) over the granting of 
patents. This Article addresses this topic by developing the notion 
of a regulatory monopoly, where a single governmental actor has 
the power to set prices in a regulatory area. 
The Article explains how regulatory monopolists like the PTO 
could enhance social welfare via differential pricing—by charging 
regulated entities differing fees based on their willingness and 
ability to pay. In particular, the Article shows how the PTO could 
increase its revenues and promote innovation by charging 
different patent “prices” for inventions in different industries. 
Such pricing could also be used to tailor effective patent term 
across industries, an emergent goal for many patent scholars. 
The Article then applies the author’s recent empirical research 
to generate potential differential patent price structures. This 
research takes advantage of a natural experiment—a change in 
patent term rules due to enactment of the TRIPS agreement in 
1994—to measure the relative importance of patent protection 
across different industries. The Article concludes by discussing 
how recent patent reform (the America Invents Act of 2011) 
provides a legal basis for the PTO to conduct differential pricing. 
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I. Introduction 
Patent law is inextricably tied to the economics of 
monopolies, as patents are legal monopolies awarded to inventors 
to incentivize innovation.1 By allowing an inventor to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling his invention for a limited 
period of time,2 patent law encourages the inventor to spend the 
fixed costs necessary to generate the invention in the first place. 
Unfortunately, patents often allow inventors to set higher prices 
than would otherwise exist in a competitive market. This tradeoff 
between incentivizing innovation and allowing monopoly pricing 
is a fundamental and contentious topic debated by patent 
scholars.3 
Despite the centrality of monopoly to patent law, scholars 
have largely overlooked another crucial role that monopoly plays 
in the patenting process. This Article addresses that situation by 
explaining how the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO)―which is the sole regulatory entity charged with awarding 
patents in the United States―has a monopoly over the granting of 
patent rights.4 If patents are viewed as products in a market, 
                                                                                                     
 1. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). Although a legal monopoly often forms 
the basis of an economic monopoly, the two concepts are distinct. See Richard A. 
Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 57, 68 (2005) (“A legal monopoly is not necessarily an economic 
monopoly; if close substitutes exist for a patented product, the patent may 
confer little power over price.”). 
 2. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). A U.S. patent also enables an inventor to 
prevent offers for sale of the patented invention within the United States, as 
well as importation of the patented invention into the country. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 213–19 (2011) (overviewing the evolution of scholarly 
discussion concerning the various benefits and costs of patents); Alan O. Sykes, 
Public Health and International Law: TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing 
Countries, and the “Doha” Solution, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 58 (2002) (noting that 
“legislatures around the world have for centuries confronted the essential 
monopoly/innovation tradeoff of the patent system”). “Although critics at times 
suggest that patent protection is excessive, and others find it inadequate, there 
is surely no consensus on the matter as a general proposition.” Id. 
 4. This point was nicely made in Michael B. Abramowicz & John H. Duffy, 
Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1541 (2009), which is a rare 
article discussing the PTO’s monopoly power. Abramowicz and Duffy focus on 
ways in which the PTO could be demonopolized. See id. at 1579–1604 (offering 
preliminary assessments of mechanisms used to demonopolize the patent 
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then the PTO is the only place where they can be obtained. And 
to receive patent protection, patent applicants and patentees 
must pay the fees the PTO charges to fund its operations.5 
More generally, this Article develops the concept of a 
regulatory monopoly, where a single governmental actor has the 
power to set prices in a regulatory area. The PTO is a 
paradigmatic example of such a monopolist.6 It exercises its 
regulatory monopoly powers when it mandates payments such as 
maintenance fees, which are periodic payments a patentee must 
make to prevent an already-issued patent from lapsing.7 The 
Article discusses in detail the operation of the PTO and 
highlights other regulatory monopolies at the federal, state, and 
local levels. 
Like a traditional monopolist, a regulatory monopolist can 
engage in differential pricing by charging different amounts to 
different people depending on how much they are willing to pay 
and how much it costs to serve them.8 Unlike a traditional 
monopolist, however, a regulatory monopolist ideally uses 
differential pricing to further the public good. This Article 
explains the prerequisites for differential pricing and discusses 
                                                                                                     
market). I focus instead on how the PTO could use its monopoly power to set 
differential prices to improve social welfare. 
 5. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (listing numerous fees associated with patent 
applications); see also Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1545–64 (describing 
the PTO’s role as a government monopolist). 
 6. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1545 (stating that the PTO 
has a monopoly over the granting of patents in the United States). 
 7. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (providing for maintenance fees); see also USPTO 
Fee Information: Current Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 
2014) (providing maintenance fee payment schedules) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of 
Price Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1241–42 (2010) (discussing the varieties of differential 
pricing). Economists also refer to differential pricing as price discrimination, of 
which there are several types. See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the prerequisites 
for differential pricing). This Article is primarily concerned with a type known 
as third-degree price discrimination, which involves charging people different 
amounts based on their membership in a group. See William W. Fisher III, 
When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 4 (2007). 
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how regulatory monopolists can use such pricing to better fulfill 
their regulatory goals. 
Unfortunately, regulatory monopolies often fail to harness 
the power of differential pricing. For instance, instead of 
differentially pricing patents, the PTO charges patent applicants 
and patentees uniform fees that do not depend on the underlying 
invention type.9 This is inefficient because, as has been shown 
empirically, inventors in different industries value patent rights 
differently,10 and the PTO’s cost of reviewing patent applications 
varies across industries.11 
This Article explains how the PTO could instead use its 
power as a regulatory monopoly to price patents differentially 
across industries. Using insights from both neoclassical and 
behavioral economics, the Article focuses on two different ways in 
which the PTO could use differential pricing to enhance social 
welfare: by lowering the cost of patenting and by customizing 
patent term across industries. 
First, differential pricing across industries, particularly with 
respect to patent maintenance fees, would increase PTO 
revenues.12 In particular, the PTO could increase maintenance 
                                                                                                     
 9. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (setting uniform fees for patent applications). 
 10. See Neel U. Sukhatme & Judd N.L. Cramer, Who Cares About Patent 
Term? Cross-Industry Differences in Term Sensitivity (Princeton Univ. Dep’t of 
Econ., Working Paper, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293245 
(deriving empirical measures of the importance of patent term across 
industries). 
 11. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding 
Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting 
Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 65 app. A, at 135–36 tbl.A1 (2013) [hereinafter 
Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting Patterns] (listing the average number of 
hours it takes to review a patent application along with the estimated cost for 
patent applications within thirty-seven industry subcategories); see also Michael 
D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed Promise of User Fees: Empirical 
Evidence from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. EMP. L. STUD. app. A, 
tbl.A1 (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Frakes & Wasserman, Failed Promise] 
(same). 
 12. Recent research suggests the PTO’s reliance on fees from patent 
applicants and patentees to fund its operations might be financially straining 
the organization, which in turn might cause a backlog in the processing of 
patent applications. See generally Frakes & Wasserman, Failed Promise, supra 
note 11 (arguing that certain fee schedules create financial risk that the PTO 
will not cover its operational costs); Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting 
Patterns, supra note 11, at 76 (arguing that the PTO is incentivized to grant 
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fees on patentees in industries that, on average, care more about 
patent protection. An increase in these late-stage fees would 
enable the PTO to lower front-end patent application fees for 
everyone, thereby reducing the total cost of patenting for most 
applicants. Alternatively, the PTO could use the additional 
revenues to improve its application review process, such as by 
hiring more examiners to expedite review. To the extent we 
believe heightened availability of patent protection or a more 
efficient patent review process leads to more inventive activity, 
differential patent pricing could promote innovation.13 
Second, the Article explains how the PTO could use 
differential pricing to tailor patent term across industries. In the 
United States, patents receive a one-size-fits-all baseline term of 
twenty years from the date of patent application filing. Many 
scholars have recognized problems with this approach because a 
uniform term seems at odds with the fact that the social costs and 
benefits of patenting likely differ across industries. Accordingly, 
some have suggested patent term should be tailored, with term 
shortened for some categories of inventions.14 
                                                                                                     
patents to make its revenue match its expenses). Part III, infra, discusses how 
differential patent pricing has the potential to improve the PTO’s financial 
standing and hence to alleviate the present backlog at the PTO. 
 13. This is not a settled point; some prominent commentators take the 
strong view that patents do not incentivize innovation at all. See Michele 
Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 
(2013) (“The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no 
empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity, 
unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded—which, as 
evidence shows, has no correlation with measured productivity.”). 
 14. See id. at 19 (“If the US economy is to have patents, we may want to 
start tailoring their length and breadth to different sectoral needs. Substantial 
empirical work needs to be done to implement this properly, although a vast 
legal literature is already pointing in this direction.”). See generally Benjamin 
N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time-to-Market of 
Inventions, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672 (2014) (describing how patent length should be 
tied to the public benefit). Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in 
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003) (discussing existing and potential policy 
levers that courts use to apply patent laws in a technology-specific manner); 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (claiming that although patent rules are 
largely one-size-fits all, in practice, they are applied in a technology-specific 
manner). 
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This Article uses differential patent pricing to suggest a more 
flexible and practical approach to term shortening: to reduce term 
on patents within a particular industry, one could raise 
maintenance fees on patents in that industry to the point where 
patentees no longer renew their patents. In other words, if a 
maintenance fee is sufficiently high for patentees in a particular 
industry, then those patentees will stop paying this fee and their 
patents will lapse. The Article highlights advantages of using 
differential pricing to limit term in this manner, such as 
increased flexibility to update prices as technology evolves, 
heightened control over the number of patents within an industry 
that terminate at a particular time, and ease of implementation 
from a political economy standpoint. 
Even though differential patent pricing is a potentially 
powerful tool, it often requires the PTO to know certain 
information. In particular, the PTO should know which 
industries have patentees that, on average, care more about 
patent protection. Put differently, the PTO needs an objective 
measure of the relative value of patent protection across 
industries. This Article reviews some of my recent empirical 
research, which provides such a measure.15 
In particular, my research exploits a natural experiment―the 
1994 passage of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).16 TRIPS changed the way 
patent term was measured for the first time in over 130 years. 
Before TRIPS, patent term was measured from the date a patent 
was granted; after TRIPS, it was measured from the date a 
patent application was filed.17 Thus, applicants in industries in 
which patent term was more valuable were more likely to speed 
up patent prosecution after TRIPS because the time an 
application was pending would now cut into total patent term. 
I use differences in the rate at which applicants sped up 
prosecution across industry categories to create an industry-level 
                                                                                                     
 15. See generally Sukhatme & Cramer, supra note 10. 
 16. See Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, PATENTLENS, 
http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/415.html (last visited Sept. 24, 
2014) (describing rights and obligations under the TRIPS agreement) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 17. See infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining how TRIPS changed term calculation). 
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measure of patent term sensitivity. Applicants who care more 
about patent term sped up more post-TRIPS vis-à-vis applicants 
who cared less. This measure, along with another I have 
developed and discuss in the Article,18 could be used to identify 
categories of inventions for which applicants care more about 
patent term. Once these categories are identified, the Article 
shows how these empirical measures could be translated into 
actual differential patent prices. 
The final section of the Article tackles a crucial, underlying 
legal question: Even if differential patent pricing is socially 
optimal, is there a legal basis for implementing it? The Article 
answers this question affirmatively, explaining how the PTO 
recently gained fee-setting authority as part of the America 
Invents Act (AIA), a comprehensive patent reform bill passed in 
2011.19 In particular, § 10 of the AIA enables the PTO to alter its 
fees to recover its aggregate estimated patent examination and 
processing costs.20 The statutory language, as well as the PTO’s 
recent interpretation of its fee-setting authority,21 indicates the 
                                                                                                     
 18. I generate two measures, both of which are highly correlated. The first 
is the applicant delay measure described here. Infra Part IV.A.1. The second is 
the ratio of patentees within a given industry that pay patent maintenance fees 
to keep their patent in force after it has issued. Infra Part IV.A.2. Either of 
these empirical measures could be used to generate differential patent prices. 
 19. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 10(a)(1), 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) (establishing and defining the PTO’s fee-setting authority). 
 20. See id. (“The Director may set or adjust by rule any fee established, 
authorized, or charged under [patent law] for any services performed by or 
materials furnished by the Office . . . only to recover the aggregate estimated 
costs to the Office . . . .”). The PTO also has its own industry-level measure of 
the amount of time allocated to patent processing, and Michael Frakes and 
Melissa Wasserman have used this measure to generate an average measure of 
examination costs across industry categories. See Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s 
Granting Patterns, supra note 11, app. A, at 135–36 tbl.A1 (listing average costs 
by industry sub-category). This measure is highly correlated with my cross-
industry patent sensitivity measure. In other words, the industries with 
applications that take the most time (and cost the most) to evaluate are the 
same industries with applicants who care the most about patent term. This 
further bolsters the rationale for differential pricing. 
 21. See generally Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211 
(Jan. 18, 2013) (exercising the PTO’s new authority to set or adjust fees). 
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agency has the power to differentially price patents based on 
industry category.22 
II. Regulatory Monopolies and Differential Pricing 
A. The Concept of a Regulatory Monopoly 
The PTO stands in a unique position as the only patent-
granting institution in the United States.23 To receive a patent, 
an applicant must apply to the PTO and pay all of its required 
fees. As the sole gatekeeper of patent rights, the PTO has a 
regulatory power that can be viewed as a monopoly. More 
generally, this Article defines this sort of power as a regulatory 
monopoly―a single locus of regulatory authority with the ability 
to set prices on regulated actors. 
                                                                                                     
 22. This conclusion holds if the PTO uses differential pricing to alter its 
revenue flow. It is less clear whether the PTO could differentially price patents 
to effectively limit patent term for certain industries. This type of differential 
pricing might require additional authorization from Congress. See infra Part V 
(discussing the PTO’s authority to differentially set fees); see also note 227 and 
accompanying text (addressing potential argument that TRIPS itself might limit 
industry-specific tailoring of patent laws). 
 23. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (granting the PTO exclusive authority to issue 
patents and to register trademarks). An inventor who is denied patent rights by 
the PTO can appeal the rejection to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. See id. § 141 (allowing appeals to the Federal Circuit); see also Jonathan 
Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 473 (2011) (describing how potential 
for appeal creates asymmetric incentives in favor of the PTO granting more 
patents than it perhaps should). But this is very rare. For example, in fiscal 
year 2013, only 132 cases were appealed to the Federal Circuit, and only 8% of 
pending cases were reversed. U.S. CT. APP. FED. CIR., FISCAL YEAR 2013 
STATISTICS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT—APPEALS FILED, 
TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD ENDED 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2013, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/ 
statistics/FY13/appeals%20filed%20term%20pend%209.30.13.pdf. Compare that 
with the 542,815 utility patent applications filed in calendar year 2012. U.S. 
Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2013, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last 
updated July 24, 2014) (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Patent 
Statistics Chart] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Nonetheless, the presence of alternative routes to obtain patent protection in a 
few cases does not change the analysis here—the PTO has a near monopoly on 
the granting of patent rights. So long as the PTO has significant market power, 
it can engage in differential patent pricing. 
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A monopolist has market power because it is the sole seller of 
a particular good or service.24 Customers cannot purchase that 
good or service elsewhere, at least at comparable cost.25 For a 
regulatory monopoly, the “good” at issue is regulatory approval. 
In the case of the PTO, the good can be conceptualized as “patent 
rights” over a particular inventive idea. 
Unlike a traditional monopolist, a regulatory monopolist 
(hopefully) does not give its regulatory approval simply in 
response to receiving money or fees from a user. Rather, a 
regulatory monopolist presumably makes its decisions based on 
law and policy―should a regulated entity be allowed to perform a 
certain action or be granted a particular right, taking into 
account applicable laws and social welfare? While regulatory 
monopolists need not charge their users anything, our focus here 
is on government institutions that charge fees in addition to 
exercising sole regulatory authority over a particular area. 
Applying this definition, we can see the PTO is hardly unique 
as a regulatory monopolist. Indeed, there are many examples of 
regulatory monopolies at all levels of government. For example, 
consider the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) role in 
approving new drugs. Absent FDA approval, a pharmaceutical 
company cannot sell, and a doctor cannot prescribe, a new drug 
for treating a disease.26 So the FDA has the sole gatekeeping 
authority in determining which drugs are approved. Moreover, as 
part of its approval process, the FDA requires applicants to pay 
fees.27 In the parlance of this Article, the FDA has a regulatory 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 702–03 
(1975) (noting that a monopolist can control market price by varying its output). 
The word “monopoly” comes from the Greek monopōlion, from monos, meaning 
“single,” and pōlein, meaning “to sell.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2014). 
 25. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 8, at 1244 (noting that the lack of 
competition gives monopolies the power to control the price of goods and 
services). 
 26. See Development and Approval Process (Drugs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ (last updated 
Aug. 19, 2014) (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (detailing the FDA approval process) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 27. See Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant to Dance: Privatizing the 
FDA Review Process, 51 FOOD DRUG L.J. 651, 652 (1996) (“For those companies 
seeking to market new drugs, food additives, or medical devices, the FDA is the 
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monopoly over the granting of new drug compounds in the United 
States and the associated fees that companies seeking regulatory 
approval must pay. 
Regulatory monopolies also abound at the state level. For 
example, states typically require people who wish to hunt or fish 
to first obtain a license from a state wildlife agency.28 Without 
such a permit, one cannot legally engage in these activities in the 
state. These wildlife agencies generally charge users a fee for this 
permit, and there is usually only one such agency in each state. 
Accordingly, state wildlife agencies are examples of state-level 
regulatory monopolists. 
Local governments have regulatory monopolies as well. 
When an individual seeks a building permit for a house, or a 
license to operate a taxicab or to sell liquor in a city, she 
generally must receive approval from a local government agency. 
Such institutions often charge a fee for a permit, and these fees 
can be quite substantial. These unitary local authorities also 
exercise regulatory monopoly power because absent their 
approval, the individual cannot engage in the regulated activity. 
B. Other Regulatory Market Structures 
While the concept of a regulatory monopoly is typically 
overlooked,29 it fits into a more general discussion on “regulatory 
                                                                                                     
only game in town.”). “As with any other monopolist, the FDA has unfettered 
ability to raise the ‘price’ and limit the ‘supply’ of its services (i.e., product 
approval), to force purchasers (i.e., product manufacturers) to engage in tying 
arrangements, and to boycott or refuse to deal with regulated entities.” Id. 
 28. See Federal, State, and Provincial Wildlife Agencies, NAT’L WILD 
TURKEY FED’N, http://www.nwtf.org/in_your_state/AllAgencies.html (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2014) (listing state and federal wildlife agencies) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. The concept has been recognized by some scholars, primarily relating to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Post-
American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 382 (2010) (“Scholars 
have long viewed the SEC as wielding a virtual regulatory monopoly over the 
provision of securities laws both at home and abroad.”); Eric J. Pan, 
Harmonization of U.S.–EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single 
European Securities Regulator, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 499, 527–28 (2003) 
(“[Al]though the SEC has a regulatory monopoly over the U.S. securities 
market, the SEC does not behave like a monopoly.”); see also David A. Hyman, 
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competition,” which has been studied in more detail.30 For 
example, there is a rich literature on the effect of state 
competition in the context of corporate governance laws.31 This 
competition arises because corporations can choose where to 
incorporate, and the laws of the state of incorporation often 
govern subsequent shareholder or other corporate litigation.32 
Many scholars argue this competition has created incentives for 
certain states to adopt more corporate-friendly laws to entice 
companies to incorporate in their states.33 As a consequence, 
states can get caught up in a “race to the bottom”—because 
                                                                                                     
Health Insurance: Market Failure or Government Failure?, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 
307, 320–21 (2008) (discussing state regulatory monopolies over insurance 
regulation); Price, supra note 27, at 652–53 (describing the FDA’s power to raise 
prices, limit supply, and ultimately force manufacturers to engage in certain 
behavior). See generally Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From U.S. 
Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities 
Regulation, 39 GA. L. REV. 525 (2005) (discussing regulatory monopoly and 
regulatory price discrimination relating to corporate charters). More often, 
“regulatory monopoly” has been used to describe monopolies generated by law 
and awarded to public utility companies, such as AT&T. See, e.g., Christopher 
Wyeth Kirkham, Note, Busting the Administrative Trust: An Experimentalist 
Approach to Universal Service Administration, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 624 
(1998) (describing the divesture of AT&T Bell companies). 
 30. See, e.g., Brummer, supra note 29, at 382 (“Recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that traditionally dominant regulators, like the SEC, have to 
compete for transactions by offering attractive securities laws because foreign 
markets have become more economically significant. This observation has 
enabled a binary regulatory monopoly/competition framework for describing the 
SEC’s regulatory power.”).  
 31. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1435, 1437 (1992) (arguing that state competition fails in certain aspects of 
corporate law, and advocating greater federal intervention in corporate law); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories 
and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 549–50 (1984) (arguing that state 
competition leads to more effective corporate law). 
 32. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663–68 (1974) (discussing the historical evolution of 
state corporate law). 
 33. See id. at 668 (describing Delaware as a state that draws most of its 
revenue from corporations). Reasons why states might want to become a locus 
for incorporation include the franchise fees that corporations must pay and the 
extra legal work it generates for the local bar. See id. (arguing that the “raison 
d’etre” for Delaware’s corporate-friendly legal atmosphere is revenue for the 
state). 
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companies can choose among many states where to incorporate, 
they pick ones with more lax governance rules, which in turn 
incentivizes states to lower governance standards further.34 
Other regulatory market structures may fall between a 
regulatory monopoly and regulatory competition. To illustrate, 
consider premerger regulation under the Hart–Scott–Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR).35 Prior to certain mergers or 
tender offers, the parties involved must file a report with two 
separate regulatory agencies―the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ Antitrust). If either the FTC or DOJ Antitrust believes the 
proposed transaction has significant anticompetitive 
consequences, then either agency can request more information 
and block the merger.36 Moreover, the party proposing the 
acquisition must pay a large fee, set by the FTC, depending on 
the size of the proposed transaction.37 
                                                                                                     
 34. See id. (portraying Delaware law as favorable because of its judiciary 
and body of case law). Other scholars claim that managers of corporations 
compete with one another in a way that actually generates a race to the top. See 
generally Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); see also Robert B. 
Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for 
Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 256–57 (2009) (arguing that 
discussion on whether federalism leads to a race to the bottom or a race to the 
top in corporate law is misguided); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 588, 610–12 (2003) (arguing that federal law, not other states’ 
laws, is the primary competition for Delaware corporate law); Marcel Kahan & 
Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
679, 681 (2002) (“Race-to-the-top scholars argue that companies incorporate 
where their value is the highest and that states accordingly compete by offering 
laws that afford optimal shareholder protection.”). 
 35. See Steven K. Bernstein & Jeff L. White, Federal Antitrust Review of 
Generic Drug Mergers: A Proposal for a More Flexible Approach, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 465, 466–68 (2008) (laying out the notification, filing fee, and other 
statutory requirements of HSR). 
 36. See id. (describing the statutory waiting period where the FTC and 
DOJ analyze the proposed transaction). 
 37. As of February 2013, the HSR fee was $45,000 for transactions between 
$70.9 and $141.8 million, $125,000 for transactions between $141.8 and $709.1 
million, and $280,000 for transactions over $709.1 million. FTC Premerger 
Notification Program, Filing Fee Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 24, 
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger-notification-program/filing-fee-
information (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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Because the FTC and DOJ Antitrust both have a veto over a 
potential merger, their regulatory power is not as complete as 
that of a regulatory monopolist such as the PTO. For example, if 
DOJ Antitrust generally favors mergers but the FTC is 
antimerger, then the FTC might hinder the DOJ’s ability to allow 
what it perceives are socially beneficial mergers.38 This 
“regulatory duopoly” structure forces its two “competitor” 
regulators to consider each other’s actions when determining 
their own policy.39 
C. The Economics of Differential Pricing 
Monopolies often (deservedly) have a bad reputation. But 
regulatory monopolies like the PTO have the potential to use 
their monopoly power to fulfill their regulatory purpose and 
promote the general good. Much of the positive potential of 
                                                                                                     
 38. Concerns about regulatory competition between the FTC and DOJ 
Antitrust have been minimal in recent years as the agencies have agreements 
and clearance procedures with one another to prevent stepping on each other’s 
toes. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, 
VII-3–VII-8 (5th ed. 2014); see also Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My 
Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1401, 1426 n.106 (2003) (referencing the recent harmony between 
the FTC and DOJ). The two agencies also specialize in different areas. See, e.g., 
The Enforcers: The Federal Government, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/ enforcers 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“Both the FTC and [DOJ Antitrust] enforce the 
federal antitrust laws. In some respects their authorities overlap, but in practice 
the two agencies complement each other. Over the years, the agencies have 
developed expertise in particular industries or markets.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Nonetheless, the potential for conflicts 
between the two regulatory agencies still exists. See Mark D. Whitener, Advice, 
Unsolicited, 22 ANTITRUST ABA 6, 6 (2008) (“[T]he ‘dual enforcement’ debate 
may be quiet for now, but it is never far from the surface.”). 
 39. See McChesney, supra note 38, at 1426 n.106 (noting that the FTC and 
DOJ Antitrust divided their regulatory authority, assigning each industry to 
one enforcement agency or the other). The FTC’s and DOJ Antitrust’s merger 
authority differs in one important way from a standard duopoly, as regulated 
parties cannot select the agency that regulates them. In other words, unlike a 
buyer who can choose from one of two sellers, merging companies are subject to 
regulation by both regulatory agencies. Nonetheless, conceptualizing this 
market as a regulatory duopoly helps us see how the actions of one agency affect 
another tasked at regulating the same conduct. 
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regulatory monopolies stems from their ability to conduct 
differential pricing. To fully understand how this works requires 
a brief primer on the economics of monopolies and differential 
pricing, which is the topic of this subpart. 
1. Prerequisites for Differential Pricing 
A regulatory monopoly like the one enjoyed by the PTO 
allows it to exercise more individualized forms of regulatory 
power. In particular, because the PTO controls the flow of patent 
rights, and because it recently gained some ability to control the 
fees it charges patent applicants, it can tailor some of the fees 
that it charges based on underlying characteristics of the 
applicant.40 It can charge more to certain applicants (e.g., those 
whose patent applications cost more to process or those who care 
more about patent rights) than to others (e.g., those whose 
applications cost less to process or those who care less about 
patent rights). In economic terms, this is referred to as price 
discrimination or differential pricing.41 
Differential pricing works because buyers differ in their 
willingness to pay for certain goods. To illustrate, consider the 
market for a new type of tennis racquet with a better balance of 
control and power than existing brands. Suppose it costs me, the 
racquet manufacturer, $100 to produce each additional racquet; 
in economics terms, we say the marginal cost of each racquet is 
$100. Additionally, assume that potential consumers of this new 
racquet fall into four camps differentiated by the amount they 
would be willing to pay. Group 1 would be willing to pay $200; 
                                                                                                     
 40. See generally Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 8 (discussing generally the 
economics of price discrimination). 
 41. Despite the negative connotation of the term “price discrimination,” it is 
not necessarily a bad thing. As explained below, in many situations, price 
discrimination can increase social welfare by increasing the number of beneficial 
transactions that take place. See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, 
Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D, and Patents, 
3 INT’L J. HEALTHCARE FIN. & ECON. 183, 184–87 (2003) (explaining how 
differential pricing could make on-patent drugs affordable in developing 
countries). In other words, absent price discrimination, some people who would 
like to purchase a good or service would be priced out of the market. 
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group 2, $150; group 3, $120; and group 4 would pay nothing at 
all. 
How would pricing work if this were a perfectly competitive 
market?42 Basic economics teaches us that in such a market, the 
maximum price a seller can charge depends on the price other 
sellers charge. If a competitor undercuts me, I am forced to lower 
my price or else customers will buy from the competitor instead. 
Sellers will compete with one another to lower the price until it 
reaches the marginal cost of the good.43 At that point, sellers will 
not lower the price any further as doing so would result in selling 
the product at a loss, and it would be better to sell nothing rather 
than to sell at a loss. So in the tennis racquet example described 
above, the price in a perfectly competitive market would be $100, 
and people in groups 1, 2, and 3 would buy the racquet (and 
people in group 4 would not). 
Accordingly, in a competitive market, there is no room for 
differential pricing. A basic law of economics—the law of one 
price44―governs, and the market-clearing price will not depend on 
consumers’ willingness to pay for a product. The price will be the 
marginal cost of the good.45 
                                                                                                     
 42. A perfectly competitive market is one in which no producer of a 
particular good is large enough to exert market power over the price of the good. 
See Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market 
Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 60, 63 (1997) (describing a 
perfectly competitive market in microeconomics as one where no actor dictates 
price). In the context of tennis racquets, a perfectly competitive market might be 
approximated by one in which multiple competitors are able to copy the design 
of the racquet only after any patents on its structure have expired. 
 43. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 24, at 702 (noting that firms in a 
perfectly competitive market maximize profits by increasing output to the point 
where marginal cost equals the market price). 
 44. The law of one price provides that the same good must sell for the same 
price in all locations. See Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Law of One Price In Financial Markets, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 191 (2003) (“The 
Law [of one price] states that identical goods must have identical prices.”). If the 
law did not hold true, then one could make unlimited profits by buying the item 
in the cheaper location and reselling it in the more expensive location. Doing 
this would increase the demand for the item in the cheaper location (thereby 
raising the price there) and increase the supply of the item in the more 
expensive location (thereby lowering the price there) until the two prices were 
equal. See id. at 192 (describing this phenomenon as arbitrage—the ability of 
individuals to purchase a product in one market and sell it in another). 
 45. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 24, at 702 (noting that this is the 
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When there is a monopoly, (or more generally, when a seller 
has some market power) however, pricing decisions change. As a 
monopolist, I do not have to worry about what my competitors 
will charge because I do not have any competitors.46 Instead, my 
pricing depends solely on my customers’ willingness to pay, along 
with the cost of producing the good. In the language of economics, 
the market-clearing price is one in which the marginal cost of the 
good equals the revenue generated from producing one additional 
unit of the good. That is, a monopolist produces goods such that 
marginal cost equals marginal revenue.47 
An important corollary to this point is that, in a monopoly, 
customers who would otherwise buy a product in a competitive 
market are priced out of the market.48 To illustrate this 
phenomenon more concretely, suppose I have some degree of 
monopoly power in the tennis racquet market discussed above.49 
Instead of setting a price of $100 (the marginal cost), I instead 
calculate that I can use my market power to maximize my profits 
by pricing my racquet above marginal cost, at $150. In that case, 
people in groups 1 and 2 would buy my racquet, but people in 
group 3 would not. 
Note that this outcome is not the best one for the 
monopolist—it costs him only $100 to produce the racquet, and 
the individuals in group 3 would be willing to pay $120 for it, but 
because the price is $150, they never purchase it. But if the 
monopolist charges $120 instead of $150, he will be losing money 
                                                                                                     
point at which firms in a competitive market will maximize profit). 
 46. As a practical matter, I almost always have some competitors—it is just 
a matter of degree. For example, even if a company had a monopoly over all 
forms of automotive transportation, some people would still have alternate 
means of travel, such as riding a bike, taking the train, or walking. So demand 
for automobiles is not completely inelastic, and if the price of driving were high 
enough, people who would otherwise drive would shift over to other modes of 
transportation. 
 47. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981) (noting that the point where marginal 
cost equals marginal revenue is profit-maximizing for monopolies). 
 48. See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. 
REV. 39, 98 n.323 (2008) (explaining that super-competitive pricing drives out 
consumers from a market). 
 49. For example, if I have a patent over the structure of the tennis racquet, 
I can prevent competitors from copying the design. 
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on the people in groups 1 and 2, who would be willing to pay $200 
and $150, respectively. So what should the monopolist do? 
If the monopolist has information on his customers’ 
willingness to pay, he could charge each customer a different 
amount for the racquet. In other words, the monopolist could 
charge the individuals in group 1, $200; individuals in group 2, 
$150; and individuals in group 3, $120. This is the essence of 
differential pricing―charging people different prices that reflect 
their differing willingness to pay. 
Put differently, differential pricing allows the monopolist to 
get the best of both worlds. The monopolist can sell to all people 
who value the good at issue more than the marginal cost—in the 
case of the tennis racquet, that is people in groups 1, 2, and 3. At 
the same time, he can charge more to people who want the 
product more. Thus, differential pricing enables a monopolist to 
maximize his revenues while selling to all customers who value 
the product more than the cost of producing it.50 
To price differentially, however, having market power and 
information on people’s willingness to purchase is not enough. A 
monopolist must also be able to block buyers of his product from 
selling to one another.51 For instance, even if a monopolist 
correctly identified consumers by their willingness to pay, a group 
3 person could buy a tennis racquet for $120 and turn around and 
resell it to a group 2 person for somewhere between $120 and 
$150. Both the group 3 person and the group 2 person would be 
better off by this transaction than if the group 2 person simply 
bought the racquet from the monopolist for $150.52 So differential 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 548, 570 (1969) (arguing that price discrimination may be the only 
feasible method of ensuring efficient allocation of resources under conditions of 
natural monopoly). 
 51. See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 59 (2001) (discussing the requirements for price 
discrimination and explaining why it cannot be met in many markets). 
 52. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) 
(articulating the Coase theorem—the idea that, absent transaction costs, private 
parties will bargain to place goods in the hands of the person who values the 
goods the most). 
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pricing works only if a seller can block arbitrage—if it can block 
buyers of products from selling to one another.53 
2. Varieties of Differential Pricing 
Market power, information on customers’ willingness to pay, 
and the ability to block arbitrage give sellers the power to engage 
in differential pricing (or as it is often called, price 
discrimination).54 As scholars have recognized, there are three 
major types of differential pricing: first-degree, second-degree, 
and third-degree price discrimination.55 
First-degree price discrimination is the most direct kind of 
differential pricing. Here, a seller charges each buyer a different 
price that corresponds to that buyer’s willingness to pay.56 First-
degree price discrimination is more of a theoretical benchmark, 
as it is generally impossible for a seller to know each buyer’s 
exact valuation of a product.57 In the tennis racquet example 
above, first-degree price discrimination would occur if the seller 
knew the exact willingness to pay for all his potential customers. 
Second-degree price discrimination involves a situation 
where a seller cannot determine on its own how much potential 
buyers are willing to pay for its product.58 Nonetheless, the seller 
is able to provide incentives to consumers that cause them to 
signal their willingness to buy through their purchasing 
decisions.59 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 3–9 (stating that price discrimination is 
hard to do because a firm must have market power, arbitrage must be limited, 
and the firm must be able to differentiate between consumers). 
 54. See id. at 3–4 (listing the three prerequisites to differential pricing). 
 55. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 8, at 1241 (discussing the three types 
of differential pricing). 
 56. See Meurer, supra note 51, at 68–69 (“In the idealized case of perfect (or 
first degree) price discrimination the seller can block arbitrage and transact at a 
different price with each buyer.”). 
 57. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 8, at 1241 (noting that first-degree 
price discrimination occurs only in rare, specialized circumstances). 
 58. See Meurer, supra note 51, at 71–80 (describing how in second-degree 
price discrimination sellers measure preferences by observing buyers’ choices). 
 59. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 8, at 1241 (noting that a common 
second-degree price discrimination technique is two-tiered pricing, where all 
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A quintessential example of second-degree price 
discrimination is product versioning. Here, a seller provides 
slightly different versions of a product that appeal to people who 
differ in their willingness to pay.60 For example, suppose the 
tennis racquet manufacturer ships the racquet in two versions―a 
regular version, and a deluxe version that costs twice the price 
but is signed by a star tennis player. Those who value the 
autographed racquet will buy the deluxe version; those who care 
only about receiving the racquet will buy the regular version. By 
creating two different versions of the same racquet, the seller has 
caused potential buyers to self-select into two different groups 
that roughly correspond to their desire to buy the racquet.61 
An advantage of second-degree price discrimination is that it 
automatically handles concerns about arbitrage between 
consumers. This is because versioning of the product is itself 
what separates consumers who differ in their willingness to 
pay.62 For example, an individual who is willing to pay for only 
the regular version of the racquet will not buy the deluxe version 
from someone who has bought it, and an individual who wants 
the deluxe version will not buy the regular version from another 
customer. 
Third-degree price discrimination involves a seller 
partitioning a market into segments and charging people within 
each segment the same price.63 A common example of third-
degree price discrimination is student discounts. Companies often 
know that students on average have less money than people who 
                                                                                                     
consumers pay an initial fee to enter the market and then pay a flat fee per unit 
purchased). 
 60. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer 
Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 136 (2013) (indicating that 
second-degree price discrimination induces consumers to reveal their 
willingness to pay). 
 61. See id. (stating that second-degree price discrimination induces 
consumers to sort themselves by willingness to pay). 
 62. See Meurer, supra note 51, at 72–75 (discussing how second-degree 
price discrimination prevents arbitrage by separating consumers based on 
willingness to pay).  
 63. See id. at 69 (providing an example of third-degree price discrimination 
that illustrates how segments are formed and how persons within each segment 
pay the same price). 
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work full-time. Accordingly, by charging students less, a company 
is able to sell to students at a lower price (corresponding to their 
lower willingness to pay) while still charging nonstudents a 
higher price.64 So long as the students’ willingness to pay exceeds 
the marginal cost of producing the good, this kind of differential 
pricing is beneficial to the monopolist.65 
One issue with third-degree price discrimination, as with 
first-degree price discrimination, is that sellers must be able to 
prevent arbitrage among consumers.66 So third-degree price 
discrimination works well in environments in which sales of 
goods between customers can be easily blocked. Airline tickets 
are a good example. These tickets are generally nontransferable, 
which means the airline will not honor the ticket if it is given or 
sold to another person. Because a person’s identity is easily 
verifiable when an individual boards a plane, third-degree price 
discrimination works well in this setting.67 
D. Differential Pricing in Regulatory Monopolies 
The previous sections discussed differential pricing in the 
context of traditional monopolies. But the same discussion 
applies to any regulatory monopoly, such as the PTO, which has 
market power over the prices it sets (user fees) on the goods it 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Strandburg, supra note 60, at 136 (noting that movie theaters often 
engage in third-degree price discrimination by selling movie tickets at different 
prices to adults, seniors, students, and children). 
 65. See Meurer, supra note 51, at 69–71 (explaining that a monopolist 
produces a good to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue); see 
also Fisher, supra note 8, at 4 (providing that senior discounts also exhibit 
third-degree price discrimination in which the seller, despite a lack of 
knowledge about purchasing power, can separate buyers into groups based upon 
perceived wealth or eagerness). 
 66. See Meurer, supra note 51, at 68–71 (arguing that both first- and third-
degree price discrimination are subject to arbitrage limits).  
 67. Here, the price discrimination is between business and leisure 
travelers. Airlines know business travelers often make travel plans with short 
lead time and are relatively price insensitive. On the other hand, leisure 
travelers can typically plan their trips much more in advance and are more 
price sensitive. By selling airline tickets at a cheaper price a few weeks before a 
flight, and then raising the price as the travel date gets closer, airlines are able 
to differentially price between both types of travelers. 
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provides (patent rights). The regulatory monopolist can set these 
prices in such a way that they best enable it to fulfill its legal and 
regulatory purposes. And in some situations, an optimal 
regulatory price structure will involve differential prices.  
Moreover, the three prerequisites for price discrimination—
market power, the ability to distinguish users based on their 
willingness to pay, and the ability to prevent arbitrage—are often 
readily met in the regulatory monopoly context.68 First, as noted, 
a regulatory monopoly has market power.69 Indeed, as the single 
locus of authority in a regulatory context, it often has unitary 
power to set fees that regulated entities must pay. 
Second, regulatory monopolies can often differentiate among 
users based on their willingness to pay for a particular good, 
often through interaction with the entities they regulate. To 
illustrate, consider the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). The SEC has a great deal of information on the public 
companies it regulates—indeed, it requires these companies to 
disclose, on a regular basis, detailed information on their 
operations to the SEC and the public.70 If a company misbehaves, 
the SEC can use this information to impose a fine.71 Here, the 
focus is not so much on a company’s willingness to pay as much 
as its ability to pay. If a company is able to pay more, the SEC can 
propose a higher fine to fulfill its regulatory purpose of deterring 
actors from engaging in malfeasance again.72 Hence, the SEC can use 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 3–4 (discussing the three prerequisites for 
price discrimination). 
 69. See Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 4, at 1545 (describing the PTO as 
a “complete monopoly”). 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012) (mandating disclosure of certain 
information in periodic reports filed with the SEC); see also Filings and Forms, 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml#.U39gRqnZfww (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing the various forms the SEC requires) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 71. See Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as a Lobster Trap: A Credible 
Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 702–03 
(2002) (noting that companies can opt-out of SEC disclosure requirements by 
remaining a private company). 
 72. See id. (arguing that the SEC’s history of strictly enforcing disclosure 
requirements contributes to its ability to prevent corporate impropriety). 
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information on the actors it regulates to tailor the fines it charges 
them.73 
Finally, preventing arbitrage between users is often 
relatively easy for regulatory monopolies. This is because there 
is generally no liquid market for the approval being given by 
the regulatory monopoly. For example, consider regulatory 
approval by the FDA for a new drug. A company cannot 
transfer approval of Drug A to another company that is seeking 
approval of Drug B. Rather, that company must obtain its own, 
individualized approval from the FDA. This works because the 
“product” being sold by the FDA is sui generis—there is no way 
to transfer regulatory approval from one product to another. 
Accordingly, issues with arbitrage are generally not as 
problematic for regulatory monopolists.74 
III. The Promise of Differential Pricing in the Market for Patents 
A. The Pricing of Patents 
To see the potential benefits of differential patent pricing, 
one must first understand how the PTO currently prices patents. 
Accordingly, this subpart provides a brief overview of the patent 
granting process and the fees the PTO charges applicants and 
patentees to fund its operations. 
As noted throughout this Article, the PTO is the sole 
government institution in the United States in charge of granting 
patents.75 To get a patent, an inventor must file a patent 
                                                                                                     
 73. See, e.g., id. at 703 (discussing the SEC’s monopoly over criminal 
sanctions in securities cases and the functions of the SEC disclosure systems). 
 74. Arbitrage may be possible for regulatory products that have a 
secondary market, such as taxicab medallions or liquor licenses. See, e.g., 
Michael M. Grynbaum, 2 Taxi Medallions Sell for $1 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/2-taxi-medallions-
sell-for-1-million-each/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (detailing one secondary sale 
of taxi medallions in New York City) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 75. The PTO grants three kinds of patents—utility, design, and plant. 
Design patents cover new and original ornamental designs in articles of 
manufacture, and plant patents cover certain types of invented or discovered 
plant species. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 161. The colloquial use of the term “patent” 
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application with the PTO.76 The PTO will then review the 
application and determine whether the described invention 
satisfies the statutory criteria for patentability—primarily, 
whether the claimed invention is useful,77 novel,78 and 
nonobvious to a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art.79 
If the PTO determines an application meets the necessary 
criteria,80 it will send the applicant a notice of allowance, and 
                                                                                                     
refers to utility patents, which cover all other patentable inventions. Utility 
patents make up over 90% of all patent filings and grants, and the vast majority 
of the PTO’s resources are spent on utility patent examination. U.S. Patent 
Statistics Chart, supra note 23. So the focus of this paper is on utility patents. 
 76. An applicant may file an original patent application with the PTO, or 
they may file an application overseas at a foreign patent office under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, and subsequently file a “national stage” application with 
the PTO. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 371 (2012). Regardless where the original 
application is filed, however, the PTO is the entity that determines whether a 
given invention will receive patent protection in the United States. 
 77. See id. § 101 (requiring patentable invention to be “new and useful”). 
This patentability requirement is referred to as the “utility” requirement. It is 
generally easily met by most applicants so long as the invention provides some 
kind of de minimis benefit and is at least theoretically capable of being used. 
 78. See id. § 102 (describing the “novelty” condition of patentability). A 
claimed invention lacks novelty if it was described in an earlier-filed patent or 
published patent application that names another inventor, or if it was 
“patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or 
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.” Id. § 102(a)(1)–(2). There are some exceptions, such as if the inventor 
himself makes the public disclosure less than one year prior to seeking patent 
protection. Id. § 102(b)(1)(A). 
 79. Id. § 103. Nonobviousness is typically the most difficult hurdle for a 
patent applicant to clear. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in 
Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 76 (2008) (stating that the nonobvious 
element “requires that an invention represent a significant technological or 
scientific breakthrough compared to what is already known or doable”). Indeed, 
it is often referred to as the “ultimate condition of patentability.” Id. at 75 (citing 
NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. 
Witherspoon ed., 1980)). 
 80. Other patentability requirements include the enablement requirement, 
which requires the patent application to enable one having ordinary skill in the 
relevant art to make and use the claimed invention, and the written description 
requirement, which requires that the specification portion of the patent 
application adequately describe the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The Federal 
Circuit has found the written description and enablement requirements to be 
separate and distinct from one another. See In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We interpret 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶1 to require a written 
description requirement separate and apart from the enablement 
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upon payment of an issue fee by the applicant, the patent 
application will turn into a valid and enforceable patent.81 
Although there is significant variation across industry categories 
and over time, about 50% of filed patent applications eventually 
issue.82 
The PTO’s chief patent-related expenses are the costs it 
incurs in reviewing patent applications.83 Unlike other 
government institutions, the PTO must rely on user fees to pay 
these costs.84 In other words, the cost of examining patent 
applications is borne by the applicants who seek review by the 
PTO and by the patentees who have already received patent 
protection. If the PTO does not receive sufficient funds from its 
users to cover its operations for a particular year, then it suffers a 
budgetary shortfall. If it receives an excess of funds, those funds 
are deposited in a Patent and Trademark Fee Reserve Fund, a 
new creation of the America Invents Act of 2011.85 These fees are 
available to the PTO so long as Congress includes them in the 
PTO’s annual appropriations bill.86 
                                                                                                     
requirement.”). 
 81. See 35 U.S.C. § 151 (describing the issuance of a patent). 
 82. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 26 fig. 11 (2012) 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2012PAR.pdf [hereinafter 
2012 PTO REPORT] (showing a 12-month rolling average allowance rate between 
41% and 52% in 2009–2012). 
 83. See id. at 74 (showing that PTO personnel costs (primarily from patent 
examination review) are its most significant expense). As its name suggests, the 
PTO also processes trademark applications, though this forms a much smaller 
part of the organization. To illustrate, at the end of fiscal year 2012, the USPTO 
had a total of 11,531 employees, 7,935 of which were patent examiners and only 
386 of which were trademark attorneys. Id. at 10. 89.8% of fiscal year 2012 
revenue came from the patent sector, while 10.2% came from trademarks. Id. at 
72.  
 84. See id. at 9 (noting that the PTO became fully dependent on user fees in 
1990 as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990)). 
 85. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 22, 125 Stat. 
284 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 42(c)(2) (2012)). 
 86. See 35 U.S.C. § 42(e) (2012) (requiring the PTO to submit to Congress 
annually certain information for appropriation purposes). In the past, excess 
funds received by the PTO were often siphoned away by Congress in a process 
known as fee diversion. See Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting Patterns, 
supra note 11, at 76–78 (discussing the fee diversion process). The PTO seems 
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The fees the PTO charges applicants fall into three main 
categories. First, the PTO charges filing, search, and examination 
fees (collectively called “front-end fees”), which are due when the 
patent application is filed.87 These fees are paid by all patent 
applicants even if their patent never issues. Front-end fees are 
supposed to pay for the patent examination process—the process 
by which the PTO determines whether an application satisfies 
the requirements of patentability.88 However, as the PTO 
explains, to foster innovation and “encourage innovators to take 
advantage of patent protection, the Office sets basic ‘front-end’ 
fees . . . below the actual cost of carrying out these activities.”89 
The PTO increased front-end fees for utility patents from $1,260 
to $1,600 in 2013 when it exercised for the first time its new fee-
setting authority under the America Invents Act. But these 
amounts are still below its $3,569 estimated cost of reviewing a 
utility patent application in 2011.90 So application fees cover less 
than half the cost of examining a patent application, and the PTO 
must rely on other fees to cover this shortfall. 
These other fees are of two varieties. The first are issue fees, 
which are fees an applicant must pay the PTO before an approved 
patent application actually issues and becomes enforceable.91 
Issue fees are paid only for patent applications that will actually 
issue (i.e., applications the PTO decides meet the legal standard 
of patentability) and not for patent applications that were filed 
but never issue.92 Even though the PTO decreased issue fees from 
                                                                                                     
to  believe that the creation of the Patent and Trademark Fee Reserve Fund 
“mitigates the issue of fee diversion” and indicates that the PTO “will continue 
to work closely with Congress to ensure full access to fees paid by patent 
applicants and patentees, consistent with the AIA.” Setting and Adjusting 
Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4255 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
 87. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (explaining the patent fee structure). 
 88. See id. § 131 (addressing the examination process for patent 
applications). 
 89.  Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4216 (Jan. 18, 
2013). 
 90. Id. at 4227. In fiscal year 2012, 30.9% of total patent revenue came 
from front-end fees. 2012 PTO REPORT, supra note 82, at 72–73. 
 91. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (describing issue fees). 
 92. See id. § 151 (“Upon payment of [the issue fee] the patent may 
issue . . . .”). 
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$1,770 to $960 in 2013, they still exceed the PTO’s estimated cost 
of $257 for actually issuing the patent.93 Accordingly, patent issue 
fees are priced well above the cost of patent issuance. 
Patentees must also pay maintenance fees, which are 
payments a patentee must make to the PTO at certain intervals 
during the patent term to keep the patent from lapsing.94 For all 
patents issued since 1981, the PTO has required three 
maintenance fee payments, due at three-and-a-half, 
seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years after patent 
issuance.95 If a patentee elects not to pay a maintenance fee, then 
the underlying patent will lapse—it will not be a valid patent and 
will no longer be enforceable.96 Put differently, failure to pay 
maintenance fees in effect shortens patent term such that it ends 
early. 
Maintaining a patent costs the PTO nothing; nonetheless, 
three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half 
maintenance fees are $1,600, $3,600, and $7,400, respectively (up 
from $1,150, $2,900 and $4,810, respectively, in 2013).97 So the 
PTO prices maintenance fees significantly above cost to subsidize 
the below-cost pricing of front-end application fees.98 
Above-cost pricing of issue fees and maintenance fees also 
allows the PTO to give discounts to certain “smaller” inventors. 
As noted, applicants and patentees pay the same amount of fees 
regardless of the type of underlying invention, or the industrial 
category into which the invention fits. But the PTO does lower 
fees depending on the size of the patent assignee, which is the 
party that owns the patent right. In particular, if a patent 
assignee is an individual, or a small business or nonprofit 
                                                                                                     
 93. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4236 (Jan. 18, 
2013). In fiscal year 2012, $463.3 million (21.3% of total patent revenue) came 
from issue fees. 2012 PTO REPORT, supra note 82, at 72–73. 
 94. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (describing maintenance fees). 
 95. See id. § 41(b)(1)–(2) (stating that patentees may receive a six-month 
grace period to pay maintenance fees, conditioned on payment of surcharges).  
 96. See id. (describing the effect of failure to pay maintenance fees). 
 97. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4236 (Jan. 18, 
2013). 
 98. In fiscal year 2012, $697.9 million (32.1% of total patent revenues) 
came from maintenance fees. 2012 PTO REPORT, supra note 82, at 72–73. 
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organization that is small enough to meet certain criteria, then 
the assignee might qualify for “small-entity” status.99 Small 
entities pay one-half of the normal PTO fees as mandated by 
Congress.100 About 20% of patents issued between 2008 and 2012 
were issued to small entities.101 
Additionally, as part of the recently-passed America Invents 
Act, Congress created a “micro-entity” status, which consists of 
two categories of inventors. First, it includes small-entity 
inventors who have filed no more than four previous U.S. patent 
applications and have gross income for the previous year that 
does not exceed three times the median household income.102 
Second, it includes inventors who are employed by an institution 
of higher education and whose patent application is assigned, 
granted, licensed, or otherwise conveyed to that institution.103 
The AIA mandates that micro-entities pay only one-quarter of the 
standard PTO fees.104 
B. The Effect of Patent Prices on Innovation 
One of the primary goals of the PTO is to promote 
innovation.105 To the extent we believe patents incentivize 
                                                                                                     
 99. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2013) (defining “small entity”). 
 100. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2012) (“[F]ees charged shall be reduced by 50 
percent with respect to their application to any small business concern . . . .”). 
 101. See 2012 PTO REPORT, supra note 82, at 185 tbl.11 (showing the percent 
of utility patents issued to small entities was between 19.76% and 20.87% in 
2008–2012). 
 102. See 35 U.S.C. § 123(a)–(c) (defining “micro-entity”). The provision also 
requires that the inventor not assign, license, or otherwise give an ownership 
stake in the patent application (or be in a contract requiring any of these 
actions) to any entity that exceeds the income limitation. Id. § 123(c). 
 103. See id. § 123(d) (providing that this obligation could be met if the 
employee of the higher education institution is under contract to assign, grant, 
license, or convey the application to the institution). 
 104. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 10(b), 125 
Stat. 284 (2011) (reducing fees “by 75 percent with respect to the application of 
such fees to entity”). 
 105. See 2012 PTO REPORT, supra note 82, at 8 (noting that the PTO’s 
mission is: “Fostering innovation, competitiveness and economic growth, 
domestically and abroad to deliver high quality and timely examination of 
patent and trademark applications, guiding domestic and international 
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innovation―something most commentators take for granted and 
the PTO certainly believes―improving access to the patent 
system should spur inventive activity.106 
One way the PTO could improve access would be to lower the 
fees it charges applicants and patentees. These could be front-end 
fees—filing, search, and examination fees paid when an applicant 
files her application—or back-end fees—issue fees paid when the 
patent issues or periodic maintenance fees paid to keep the 
patent in force after issuance. All else being equal, lowering any 
of these fees would lower the cost of obtaining and maintaining a 
patent. On the margin, this should increase patenting activity 
and spur innovation. 
Of course, such a change might cause the PTO to lose 
revenue. For example, if the increase in patent applications filed 
under the reduced fee regime is not sufficient to make up for the 
revenue lost because fees are lower, then the PTO’s revenue 
would decrease. To give a simple numerical example, suppose 
that 1 million patent applications would be filed if the cost of 
filing and obtaining a patent were $5,000, and 1.2 million 
applications would be filed if this cost were lowered to $4,000. 
Although the number of applications filed increased from 1 
million to 1.2 million (20% increase) in response to the decrease 
in cost from $5,000 to $4,000 (20% decrease), the total revenue 
has decreased from $5 billion to $4.8 billion. So the patent office 
would lose $200 million in revenue even though the number of 
applications filed has increased because this increase was not 
sufficient to make up for the reduced fees. 
This possibility of lost revenue might create a serious 
problem because the PTO depends entirely on user fees for 
                                                                                                     
intellectual property policy, and delivering intellectual property information and 
education worldwide, with a highly skilled, diverse workforce”). The PTO also 
notes it is “uniquely situated to support the accomplishment of the Department 
[of Commerce]’s mission to create the conditions for economic growth and 
opportunity by promoting innovation, entrepreneurship, competitiveness, and 
stewardship.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
 106. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4214 (Jan. 
18, 2013) (explaining how the patent laws operate to spur innovation). But see 
Boldrin & Levine, supra note 13, at 3 (arguing there is no evidence that patents 
increase productivity). 
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funding.107 So ideally, any change in fees should strive to be at 
least revenue-neutral. In particular, the goal should be to 
structure fees such that the PTO balances its budget but 
innovation is maximally incentivized. 
How could this be accomplished? In a recent rule, the PTO 
described its strategy: 
The Office’s current fee structure includes statutory fees (set 
by Congress) that provide lower, below cost fees on the front 
end of the patent process (e.g., filing, searching, and 
examination fees), which are in turn balanced out by higher, 
above cost fees on the back end (i.e., issue and maintenance 
fees). This balance enables the Office to provide lower costs to 
enter the patent system, making it easier for inventors to 
pursue patents for their innovations, and these lower front-
end fees are off-set by higher back-end fees. Congress set this 
balance when it established the existing statutory fee 
structure, and the Office continues to follow this model with 
the fee structure in this final rule, because a key policy 
consideration is to foster innovation by facilitating access to 
the patent system.108 
So the key is to subsidize lower front-end application fees with 
higher back-end issue fees and maintenance fees. 
Why might this fee structure promote innovation? The 
answer to this question finds support in both neoclassical and 
behavioral economics. Traditional economics teaches us people 
discount events that happen in the future.109 Suppose someone is 
asked whether they prefer to receive one dollar today versus one 
dollar tomorrow. Most people would prefer to receive the dollar 
today, not merely because of inflation but because an individual 
can use that dollar today to buy something.110 In economic terms, 
                                                                                                     
 107. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 23, at 499 (noting the importance of user 
fees); Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting Patterns, supra note 11, at 76 
(same). 
 108. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4214 (Jan. 18, 
2013). 
 109. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral 
Economics: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1119 (2000) (“Because of the time value of money, rational 
actors will discount future income.”). 
 110. See id. (“[T]o give up a dollar today, [rational actors] will demand 
something more than a dollar tomorrow.”). 
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whatever activity the individual could use that dollar for today is 
the opportunity cost of receiving it tomorrow instead.111 
Behavioral economics adds to this discussion by introducing 
something known as hyperbolic discounting, which describes how 
people are often inconsistent in discounting over time.112 In 
particular, many people are “present-biased”—their level of 
discounting is very steep for events in the near-future but much 
less-steep for events later on.113 So discounting can be important 
even when dealing with relatively short-run events. 
A classic illustration of hyperbolic discounting comes from an 
extension to the dollar-today, dollar-tomorrow hypothetical. 
Suppose instead the operative questions are whether you would 
prefer: (1) a dollar today versus three dollars tomorrow; or (2) a 
dollar in one year versus three dollars in one year and one day. 
Many people would prefer receiving the dollar today in 
hypothetical (1) but the three dollars in hypothetical (2). This is 
referred to as time-inconsistent behavior and cannot be explained 
by traditional exponential discounting. Rather, one needs 
discounting that is very steep at first and then becomes 
shallower, which is the essence of hyperbolic discounting.114 
Despite differences in the neoclassical and behavioral 
approaches, both point to the same conclusion: inventors’ 
behavior will be more influenced by front-end rather than back-
end patent fees. In other words, discounting (whether hyperbolic 
or not) suggests that changes in front-end fees will affect 
potential patent applicants’ behavior more than similar changes 
to back-end fees. 
                                                                                                     
 111. See Rafael I. Pardo, Reconceptualizing Present-Value Analysis in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 113, 131 (2011) (noting that the 
time value of money reflects opportunity cost as well as any expected inflation). 
 112. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 109, at 1120 (indicating that, 
according to behavioral science literature, personal discount rates tend to 
decrease more as the date of an expected reward is delayed). 
 113. See id. (noting that this principle leads people to consume more in the 
present even if they previously planned to consume less). 
 114. See R.H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 
ECON. LETTERS 201, 202 (1981) (discussing work by R. Strotz, Myopia and 
Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165, 165–
80 (1955)).  
1886 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855 (2014) 
This is why the PTO’s basic pricing strategy makes sense. 
Front-end fees are most salient to potential inventors; hence, 
reducing them encourages patenting behavior and (hopefully) 
innovation.115 On the other hand, applicants are less affected by 
changes to back-end fees, so these fees can be increased to recover 
lost revenue. In economic terms, potential inventors’ demand for 
patent protection is relatively elastic with respect to front-end 
fees (i.e., small changes in these fees will have a relatively large 
effect on patenting behavior) but is relatively inelastic with 
respect to back-end fees (i.e., small changes in these fees will 
have a relatively small effect on patenting behavior).116 
C. Third-Degree Price Discrimination in the Market for Patents 
The previous subpart described why the current fee 
structure, which charges patentees more on back-end versus 
front-end fees, arguably promotes innovation. But this fee 
structure is not optimal; indeed, this Article explains how it could 
be improved. In particular, the PTO could increase its back-end 
revenues by engaging in third-degree price discrimination, where 
it implements differential pricing of issue fees, maintenance fees, 
or both across industry categories. The variation in fees across 
industries would stem from industry-level differences in 
patentees’ willingness to pay to obtain and maintain patent 
protection. As discussed later, the PTO could use the increased 
revenue it receives from differential pricing to lower front-end 
fees or to improve the services it provides to patent applicants, 
such as by hiring additional examiners to reduce application 
backlog. 
                                                                                                     
 115. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO SECTION 10 FEE 
SETTING—DESCRIPTION OF ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 10–12 (2013), 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/aia_section_10_elasticity_supplement
.pdf [hereinafter ELASTICITY ESTIMATES] (describing USPTO’s estimates of price 
elasticity of demand for changes in user fees). 
 116. See id. at 1 (explaining that price elasticity of demand measures how 
sensitive consumers—here, patent applicants—are to changes in price—here, 
user fees); see also Gaetan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie, On the Price Elasticity of Demand for Patents, 74 OXFORD BUL. OF 
ECON. AND STAT. 58 (2012) (analyzing effect of patent fees on patent demand). 
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To understand how third-degree price discrimination could 
help the PTO achieve its regulatory goals,117 recall that this form 
of differential pricing involves partitioning a market into 
segments and charging people within each segment the same 
price.118 Often this is done for identifiable groups that are less 
likely to pay for a good; canonical examples include discounts for 
students or seniors.119 Third-degree price discrimination allows a 
monopolist to charge more to people in groups that, on average, 
are willing to pay more for a particular good and to charge less to 
people in groups that, on average, are willing to pay less. The 
monopolist can therefore charge the former group a higher price 
while not pricing the latter group out of the market.120 
In the context of patents, the PTO could use third-degree 
price discrimination to charge different prices to applicants and 
patentees in different industries depending on their willingness 
to pay for patent protection.121 For example, if pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                     
 117. Theoretically, the PTO could also engage in first-degree price 
discrimination, in which it customizes fees for each applicant such that 
individuals are charged exactly the amount they are willing to pay for patent 
protection. In reality, the PTO could not engage in this form of differential 
pricing because it would lack individualized information on patentees’ 
willingness to pay. First-degree price discrimination is more of a theoretical 
benchmark than something achievable in practice. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra 
note 8, at 1241 (noting that first-degree discrimination occurs only in rare 
circumstances). 
 118. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 4 (“In third-degree price discrimination, the 
seller does not know the purchasing power of the individual buyers, but is able 
to separate them into individual groups that correspond roughly to their wealth 
or eagerness.”). 
 119. See id. (explaining the common practice of third-degree price 
discrimination to create student and senior discounts). 
 120. See Posner, supra note 50, at 570 (noting that price discrimination 
helps monopolists maximize profits). 
 121. The PTO already engages in a limited form of third-degree price 
discrimination through its use of small-entity and micro-entity status. See supra 
notes 99–104 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of small-
entity and micro-entity status). Patent applicants and patentees who qualify as 
“small entities” pay one-half the regular PTO fees; individuals who qualify as 
“micro-entities” pay one-quarter the regular fees. Id. It is reasonable to assume 
that given their small size, these individuals have a lower willingness or ability 
to pay PTO fees than other patent applicants. Accordingly, by charging these 
individuals less money, the PTO is, on the margin, allowing some small entities 
or micro-entities to enter the market for patents when they would otherwise be 
priced out if they did not receive any discounts. 
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patentees care more about patent protection than mechanical 
patentees, the PTO could charge the former higher maintenance 
fees than the latter. Because the pharmaceutical patentees care 
more about patent protection, they will be willing to pay more, 
hence enabling the PTO to increase its revenues. 
Applying the general discussion from Part II.C.1 to the 
present context, we see that, to implement third-degree price 
discrimination across industries, the PTO must satisfy three 
prerequisites: (1) it must have market power; (2) it must have 
industry-level information on users’ willingness to pay; and (3) it 
must be able to prevent arbitrage between users.122 Requirements 
(1) and (3) are easily met here. First, the PTO has a regulatory 
monopoly over the granting of patent rights in the United 
States.123 Moreover, to obtain a patent and keep it in force, an 
applicant must pay whatever fees the PTO charges.124 
Additionally, preventing patentees from arbitraging patent 
rights should not be a major concern for the PTO. This is 
primarily because patent rights are not fungible, and approval 
and continued validity of patents are not transferable rights. For  
                                                                                                     
 122. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the prerequisites for third-degree 
price discrimination). 
 123. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (granting the PTO sole authority to issue 
patents and to register trademarks). 
 124. See id. § 41 (implementing fees for patent applications). Although the 
PTO has a regulatory monopoly over the granting of patent rights, trade secret 
protection is a substitute legal right that some inventors might pursue. See 
Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1239, 1268 (1995) (noting that trade secret law is a species of state common 
law). Trade secret law prevents the misappropriation of private information by 
competitors or others. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474–
75 (1974) (stating that a trade secret may consist of any formula, device, or 
compilation of information that gives a business an advantage over competitors 
who do not possess the trade secret). Of course, a trade secret works only if the 
product or service at issue cannot easily be reverse-engineered—if a competitor 
can buy the product and figure out the inventive or novel aspect of its design, 
then trade secret law provides no protection against copying or replication. A 
valid patent, on the other hand, allows an inventor to exclude his competitors 
from making, using, or selling the invention, even if the competitor had been 
unaware of the existence of the patent prior to being sued for infringement. See 
id. at 474 (holding that federal patent law does not preempt state trade secret 
laws). But see 35 U.S.C. § 273 (introducing, as part of the America Invents Act of 
2011, a limited defense to infringement based on prior commercial use). 
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example, an individual who receives approval of patent 
application A cannot transfer that approval to a different patent 
application B. Each patent application is evaluated 
independently on its own merits.125 Hence, the PTO can 
differentially price patents without fear that applicants can get 
around this pricing by selling approved patent rights to one 
another. 
The remaining requirement is the trickiest one—obtaining 
industry-level information on users’ willingness to pay. However, 
my recent empirical research (discussed in more detail in Part IV, 
infra) sheds light on this precise topic. In particular, my research 
uses actual patent applicant behavior to generate an objective, 
cross-industry measure of how much applicants care about patent 
protection. The PTO could use this information to restructure its 
patent fees so that patentees are charged based on how much 
they care about patent protection. 
While the PTO could use differential pricing for any of the 
fees it charges, maintenance fees—particularly the final 
maintenance fee due at eleven-and-a-half years—might be the 
best one to price differentially. There are at least a couple reasons 
for this. First, to the extent we are concerned that higher fees 
might reduce incentives to innovate, it would be best to raise the 
fees charged latest in the patent lifecycle. Applicants are likely to 
discount these fees the most, and it seems unlikely that a modest 
increase in these fees would greatly affect their decision to 
engage in inventive activity. 
Second, maintenance fees are relatively low compared to the 
revenues that a successful invention likely generates.126 Current 
maintenance fees at three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half and 
eleven-and-a-half years are $1,600, $3,600 and $7,400, 
respectively.127 Although there might be uncertainty when a 
                                                                                                     
 125. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (explaining the examination process of a patent 
application). 
 126. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4237 (Jan. 
18, 2013) (listing current maintenance fees). 
 127. See id. at 4236 (increasing fees most recently in 2013, from $1,150, 
$2,900, and $4,810, respectively). In a follow-up empirical paper, I am 
researching whether patentees and patent applicants changed their behavior in 
 
1890 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855 (2014) 
patent issues whether it will be successfully commercialized, that 
uncertainty should be reduced or eliminated by the time the last 
maintenance fee is due. And because the present value (at the 
time of maintenance fee payment) of a commercially successful 
product is likely to exceed $7,400, it is unlikely that a modest 
increase in maintenance fees would affect potential inventors’ ex 
ante decisions whether to innovate. 
D. Differential Pricing to Incentivize Innovation 
The previous subpart described how the PTO could 
implement differential patent pricing across industry categories, 
and how this would increase PTO revenues. But how might the 
PTO use these additional revenues to incentivize innovation or 
improve the patenting process? 
First, the PTO could encourage innovative activity by using 
the additional funds received from differential pricing of back-end 
fees to reduce front-end fees, which are more likely to be salient 
in affecting inventors’ decisions.128 As discussed previously, to the 
extent patents incentivize innovation, lower front-end fees are 
likely to promote inventive activity.129 Differentially higher back-
                                                                                                     
response to this increase. I am also using the increase as a natural experiment 
to reveal information about relative patent values across industries. 
 128. See supra notes 107–116 and accompanying text (describing price 
elasticity as it applies to patent fees). 
 129. Jonathan Masur has argued that the relatively high cost of patent 
applications could be useful to screen out low-quality patent applications. See 
Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 687, 711–12 (2012) (explaining that a costly patent screening process 
prevents inefficiency and the over-granting of patents); cf. Ian Ayres & Paul 
Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation 
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 986–87 (1999) (discussing how uncertainty in patent 
rights can be socially optimal by increasing social welfare and only weakly 
reducing incentives to invent generated by patent monopoly rights). To the 
extent one is concerned about too many junk patent applications, the PTO might 
instead consider lowering issue fees rather than front-end fees. This would only 
benefit those individuals whose patent applications actually meet the standards 
of patentability, thereby incentivizing innovation only for applicants who believe 
their patent will actually issue. 
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end fees, on the other hand, are likely to have little negative 
effect on inventive activity. 
Put differently, one can view differential pricing combined 
with revenue neutrality as a type of transfer payment. The PTO 
can charge those who derive more benefit from the patent system 
(i.e., those who care more about patent protection) a higher fee. It 
can transfer this additional revenue to individuals who care less 
about patent protection by reducing their fees. The groups that 
care more about patent protection are unlikely to change their 
behavior significantly as their demand for patent protection is 
inelastic. The groups that care less about patent protection, on 
the other hand, might increase innovative activity because the 
price of patenting has decreased for them.130 
Alternatively, the extra revenue obtained from differential 
pricing could be used more directly to improve the patent system. 
Legal scholars often talk of a patent system in crisis.131 While 
patent trolls and escalating litigation costs grab headlines, a 
more prosaic concern is the increased delay and backlog of 
applications at the PTO.132 Over the past fifteen years, the PTO 
has taken longer and longer to determine whether an applicant is 
deserving of a patent.133 
                                                                                                     
 130. See ELASTICITY ESTIMATES, supra note 115, at 2–4 (discussing the 
elasticity of demand for patents). 
 131. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW 
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (describing the current state of affairs as a 
“patent crisis”); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (same); 
Masur, supra note 23, at 477 (same). But see John M. Golden, Proliferating 
Patents and Patent Law’s Cost Disease, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 457 (2013) 
(suggesting claims of a patent “crisis” might be overstated). 
 132. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Pendency Time Series and Why Care About 
Prosecution Delays, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/ 
patent/2012/09/patent-pendency-time-series-and-why-care-about-prosecution-
delays.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (describing the growing issue of 
increased patent pendency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 133. See id. (showing that median prosecution pendency for U.S. utility 
patents has increased from about 2 years in 1999 to about 3.25 years in 2012, 
with a peak over 3.6 years in 2009). Patent application pendency appears to 
have decreased a bit in the past few years, likely in part because the PTO has 
hired thousands of new patent examiners and also due to the 2007–2009 
recession and persisting weakness in the U.S. economy. Id. 
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Recent research suggests the PTO’s reliance on fees from 
patent applicants and patentees to fund its operations might be 
straining the organization financially, which in turn might cause 
this backlog. In particular, the PTO might be deferring patent 
applications that take longer to examine in favor of ones that 
take less time to manage its workload and maximize the fees it 
gathers.134 
Differential pricing has the potential to improve the PTO’s 
financial standing and hence alleviate the backlog problem. For 
example, increased revenues obtained from differential pricing 
might be used to hire more examiners in technology groups with 
insufficient resources. By doing this, the workload of examiners 
in these areas might be alleviated, and delays that applicants 
face might be reduced. This reduction in PTO delay increases the 
value of patent protection to applicants.135 
Moreover, this sort of reform could improve the quality of the 
PTO’s review process.  If examiner workload were lessened, then 
examiners could devote more time to review each application they 
are assigned. More time to review applications could in turn 
reduce the granting of “bad patents”—patents the PTO should 
never have granted because they do not meet the statutory 
standards of patentability.136 A reduction in bad patents would in 
turn benefit society as a whole, as the costs these patents impose 
would be reduced.137 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Frakes & Wasserman, Failed Promise, supra note 11, at 10–12 
(noting how the PTO operates under budget constraints). 
 135. See id. at 5 (explaining costs associated with examination delay). It might 
be preferable to use additional revenue from differential pricing to streamline 
PTO processes rather than to lower front-end fees, as recent research suggests 
higher back-end fees might distort PTO examination practices or granting 
behavior. See generally id.; Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting Patterns, supra 
note 11. 
 136. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in 
the Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of 
Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 76 (2006) (discussing PTO’s incentives to “grant 
patents without being unduly concerned about the quality of the examination 
process”). 
 137. See Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad 
Patents?, 28 REG. 10, 10–11 (2005) (describing how an examiner spends on average 
only eighteen hours reviewing each patent application and how more PTO funding 
might alleviate the bad patents problem). But see Keson & Gallo, supra note 136 (describing 
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E. Differential Pricing to Limit Patent Term 
Our discussion thus far has focused on increasing PTO 
revenues through the use of differential patent pricing on back-
end fees, and then using those revenues to lower front-end fees or 
otherwise improve the patenting process. But differential pricing 
could also achieve a more fundamental goal: to create different 
effective patent terms for different categories of inventions. 
1. The Rationale for Tailoring Term for Different Industries 
Scholars have long debated the benefits and costs of patents. 
Most agree the primary benefit of patent protection is that it 
incentivizes innovation—awarding a patentee a legal monopoly 
over his invention allows him to recoup fixed costs incurred in 
producing his invention.138 But patents also generate a number of 
costs. In addition to the deadweight loss caused by heightened 
monopoly pricing, a surfeit of patents increases the risk of 
inadvertent infringement and can lead to patent thickets, with 
multiple parties having overlapping patent rights.139 Such 
thickets make it difficult for new innovators, who must obtain 
licenses from multiple patentees.140 Moreover, the proliferation of 
patents increases the prevalence of patent litigation, which is 
particularly costly in suits involving non-practicing entities (often 
pejoratively referred to as “patent trolls”). These entities do not 
                                                                                                     
why much of the money might be wasted on review of useless patent 
applications). 
 138. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 1576 (“Patent law is our 
primary policy tool to promote innovation, encourage the development of new 
technologies, and increase the fund of human knowledge.”). 
 139. See Sukhatme & Cramer, supra note 10, at 5 (explaining how patent 
thickets impose costs on society); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: 
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 
119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001) (acknowledging 
that the current patent system causes concern because of “excessively loose 
standards” at the PTO). 
 140. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Holdup, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 608 (2007) (explaining how “standards hold-up” affects the 
patent market by requiring expensive licenses from multiple patentees). 
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produce anything but merely acquire patents to sue companies 
and extract monopoly rents from them.141 
One way in which the patent system balances the costs and 
benefits of patents is by limiting their term. This seems 
reasonable—we want to use patents to incentivize innovation but 
are also cognizant of their social costs, so we give inventors a 
monopoly over their inventions for a limited time.142 Ideally, 
patent term would be invention-specific, and it would be only as 
long as necessary to incentivize invention, as additional term 
merely gives a patentee excess monopoly rents and incurs social 
costs.143 
Of course, this is not how patent term is currently awarded. 
Rather, all inventions receive the same baseline patent term 
regardless of their underlying industry.144 A new type of LED 
receives the same baseline term as a new plastic polymer, a new 
cancer drug, a new semiconductor chip, or a new type of garbage 
can: twenty years from the date the patent application was 
filed.145 
Regardless of one’s perspective, it seems unlikely that, in an 
ideal world, patent term would be the same across all industry 
categories because the costs and benefits of patents vary across 
                                                                                                     
 141. See James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 
34 REG. 26, 29 (2012) (providing a definition of “patent trolls” and introducing 
the problems they cause). 
 142. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 129, at 992 (noting that patentees 
have “unchecked monopoly power” during the patent term and then no legally 
enforceable market power after the patent expires). 
 143. See Alan Devlin & Neel U. Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the 
Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 903 (2009) 
(arguing that, in the context of certain business method patents, if an invention 
would be produced even if patent protection were unavailable, then it should not 
receive patent protection in the first place). 
 144. See 35 U.S.C. 135 (2012) (describing the uniform term of patents). 
 145. Id. Congress has passed some industry-specific adjustments to patent 
term. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 1630–31 (noting that Congress has 
lengthened the patent term for pharmaceutical patents). Most notably, the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman 
Act) enabled “pioneer drugs” to receive patent term extensions of one-half the 
time they spend in the investigational new drug period during FDA review. Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). Nonetheless, such ad hoc extensions do not 
affect the twenty-year baseline term. 
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these categories.146 For example, a patented invention in a fast-
moving technological field might be obsolete well before its term 
ends. In other fields, however, each additional week of patent 
term might translate into millions of dollars in additional sales.147 
Still, there are many good reasons for having a uniform 
patent term. One might worry about the extent to which politics 
or other considerations not related to social welfare affect the 
term awarded in certain industries.148 Even without such 
concerns, it is very difficult to determine what terms are optimal 
for patents in different industries. Answering this question 
requires, for example, considering how the following vary across 
industries: incentives to invent, rates of technology obsolescence, 
presence of regulatory delays, time to commercialize a product, 
and patent-generated social welfare costs.149 
Nonetheless, it might be possible for these objections to be 
overcome. For example, in Part IV, I describe objective measures, 
which I derived using empirical methods, of the relative 
importance of patent protection across different industries.150 
Although I do not intend to suggest these measures are by 
themselves dispositive as to what patent term should be—as 
                                                                                                     
 146. Laws governing the baseline patent term are almost never changed, 
suggesting that term is not updated in response to technological, societal, or 
legal changes. Since the Patent Act of 1790, when Congress established a term 
of fourteen years from patent issuance, the baseline term for a patent has 
changed only three times: in 1836 (increased to twenty-one years from patent 
issuance), 1861 (decreased to seventeen years from patent issuance), and 1995 
(changed to twenty years from application filing date). 
 147. The most prominent example in which patent term really seems to 
matter is pharmaceuticals, as a drug may not even be salable for years into its 
patent term due to the extensive FDA regulatory approval process. 
 148. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1398 (2009) 
(noting that altering a uniform patent term would require industry-wide 
consensus, which limits the ability to use patent term to benefit special interest 
groups); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. L. REV. 845, 847 (2006) (describing the 
problem of “uniformity cost” in patent law, which stems from its attempt to 
apply “a socially costly, uniform solution to problems of differing magnitudes”). 
 149. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 1630–38 (providing numerous 
reasons against using industry-specific legislation to customize patent term). 
 150. See infra Part IV (discussing differential pricing and empirical methods 
for measuring value of patents across industries). 
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noted above, determining industry-specific, optimal terms is 
likely to be a complicated, multi-factor inquiry—my research 
could nonetheless inform this discussion.151 
2. Differentially Raising Maintenance Fees to Limit Term 
It is one thing to determine what constitutes an optimal term 
in a particular industry; it is another thing to actually implement 
it. Assuming policymakers wish to have industry-specific patent 
terms, they should use the more nuanced approach to 
implementing differential term described in this Article. Namely, 
they should use differentially higher maintenance fees to 
effectively limit term to the extent they desire. 
To illustrate, suppose patentees in a particular industry face 
the following maintenance fee schedule: at three-and-a-half, 
seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years, they must pay 
$1,600, $3,600, and $74,000, respectively. The only difference 
between these hypothetical maintenance fees and actual current 
fees is the eleven-and-a-half year fee, which has been increased 
tenfold, from $7,400 to $74,000. As a practical matter, only the 
relatively few patentees who value their patent this highly would 
be willing to make this hypothetical eleven-and-a-half year 
maintenance payment.152 For all other patentees, their patent 
would end at eleven-and-a-half years. 
This hypothetical demonstrates how maintenance fees could 
be used to limit patent term in a controlled fashion. For example, 
                                                                                                     
 151. One key is to develop an objective measure of optimal patent term 
across industries; that is, a measure that is not subject to manipulation and can 
be updated using data. Ben Roin suggests one possible measure is the average 
time needed to take an invention to market. He claims this variable is a good 
proxy for many factors that play a role in determining optimal patent term. See 
Roin, supra note 14 (discussing factors that could help determine optimal patent 
term across different industries). 
 152. One might argue that some patentees would make this payment but 
might be capital constrained and unable to do so. Presumably, if such patentees 
believe this payment would be worthwhile, they would have access to capital 
markets and would be able to borrow the money necessary to make the 
payment. Regardless, the basic point holds: Only people who value their patent 
more than this amount will renew the patent. That does not necessarily mean 
that everyone else who does not renew does not value the patent that highly. 
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if we want 50% of patents in a particular industry to expire at a 
particular time, we can raise maintenance fees on patents in that 
industry to the level at which we expect 50% of patentees to stop 
paying. If we want 90% of patents to expire, we can increase fees 
even more to achieve this goal. And if we want all patents within 
an industry to expire, we can make fees as high as necessary to 
ensure this happens. In such a scenario, forward-looking 
inventors will no longer assume that patent term is twenty years 
from the date of patent application but rather it is the length of 
time until the prohibitively high maintenance fee is due. 
Put differently, limiting patent term is equivalent to 
mandating an infinite maintenance fee at the time one wishes a 
patent to expire. Viewed this way, proposals to limit patent term 
are essentially limiting cases of the general principle enunciated 
here: that is, the PTO can arbitrarily control how many patents 
remain in effect in a particular industry via differential patent 
pricing. 
Such pricing gives policymakers a bevy of ways in which to 
limit term. Even if just the current maintenance fee date 
schedule is used, one could limit patent term in a particular 
industry to: (1) three-and-a-half years from patent issuance; 
(2) seven-and-a-half years from patent issuance; 
(3) eleven-and-a-half years from patent issuance; or (4) twenty 
years from patent application filing. Moreover, a policymaker 
could increase maintenance fees in such a way that not all 
patents expire but rather some desired percentage of patents are 
not renewed.153 
If one wishes to customize patent term across industries, 
there are a number of advantages to using differential patent 
pricing to achieve this goal rather than simply mandating that 
patents in certain industries have a reduced duration. First, 
                                                                                                     
 153. David Olson recently suggested that maintenance fees could be 
increased based on the number of nonpracticing patents within a patent owner’s 
portfolio. The idea is that increased fees will deter nonpracticing entities, often 
referred to as patent trolls, from amassing patents. See David S. Olson, 
Removing the Troll from the Thicket: The Case for Enhancing Patent 
Maintenance Fees in Relation to the Size of a Patent Owner’s Non-Practiced 
Patent Portfolio, (B.C. Law Sch. Legal Studies Res. Paper Series No. 303, at 2 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318521 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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differential patent pricing enables policymakers to have 
heightened flexibility to deal with outlier inventions. Regardless 
of the industry at issue, there will likely be unusual inventions 
for which additional patent term is crucially important. Instead 
of dictating that these inventions have some limited term, the use 
of differential patent pricing allows patentees of very valuable 
inventions to extend their term as desired. 
Second, limiting term for patents in particular industries is a 
drastic shift that would require congressional action. This would 
seem difficult to achieve in practice as those industries would 
likely fight such legislation with full force. Allowing the PTO to 
use differential patent pricing to achieve the goal of limiting 
patent term might also require congressional action, but it is a 
more limited and nuanced step that seems more likely to be 
achievable in practice.154 
Third, differential patent pricing allows for more dynamic 
changes than a scheme that simply limits patent term. For 
example, suppose there is a push to limit term for software 
patents to eight years from the date of patent issuance. Instead of 
limiting patent term for this group of inventions, the PTO could 
simply increase the seven-and-a-half year maintenance fee. The 
PTO could then monitor how patentee renewal decisions are 
affected as well as decisions by prospective inventors regarding 
future innovation in this field. If innovation appears to be greatly 
harmed by this fee increase, then maintenance fees could be 
reduced. If there appears to be no effect on innovation, then the 
fees could be increased more.155 
Despite these advantages, there are limits to what 
differential pricing of maintenance fees can accomplish in terms 
of tailoring patent term. If we feel that patent term is insufficient 
in certain industries,156 then differential pricing of maintenance 
fees would be unable to provide this additional term. 
                                                                                                     
 154. See infra Part V for legal analysis of this issue. 
 155. Introducing cross-industry variation into maintenance fees would also 
have the ancillary benefit of generating rich data on the relative importance of 
patents across industries. This could be used to perform more research on the 
relationship between patents and innovation, which in turn could be used to 
improve the patent system. 
 156. This might be true, for example, with respect to pharmaceuticals, which 
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Even so, other forms of differential patent pricing might be 
able to handle this situation. For example, while the present 
discussion has focused on differential patent pricing of 
maintenance fees, the same logic can be applied to other prices in 
the patent system. Suppose patent applicants were asked, when 
they apply, to choose how much patent term they wished to have. 
Some might be willing to pay more to get a longer term. Such a 
pricing scheme would essentially be second-degree price 
discrimination—the PTO would offer multiple versions of patents 
that differ by term. Applicants would reveal their willingness to 
pay based on which patent term they choose.157 
IV. The Empirical Basis for Differential Patent Pricing 
This Article has shown how the PTO could use differential 
patent pricing to better achieve one of its core regulatory 
purposes—to promote innovation through the U.S. patent system. 
In particular, the Article has explained how setting industry-
specific maintenance fees might be a good way to implement 
differential pricing.158 
But an important question remains: even if the PTO can set 
differential patent prices, what prices should it set? The present 
Part tackles that issue. It begins with an overview of my recent 
                                                                                                     
take a tremendous amount of time and money to develop. See Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 14, at 1631 (noting that Congress extended the patent term for 
certain pharmaceutical patents). But see Boldrin & Levine, supra note 13, at 13–
14 (arguing for the abolition of pharmaceutical patents). 
 157.  See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining second-degree pricing 
discrimination). Somewhat relatedly, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have 
suggested the PTO could offer applicants two types of patents: ordinary patents 
and “super patents,” which undergo a more rigorous examination by the PTO. 
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 
75, 85–86 (2005) (stating that such a system would depend on courts giving less 
weight to the standard patent than the super patent). A patentee who opts for a 
super patent could receive a stronger presumption of validity in subsequent 
litigation. Id.; see also Lemley et al., supra note 137, at 10–13 (proposing to have 
a “gold-plated” patent review, where applicants who want a stronger 
presumption of validity for their patents could opt for a more searching (and 
costly) review). 
 158. See supra Part III.D (arguing that differential pricing could increase 
innovation). 
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empirical research, which quantifies the extent to which patent 
applicants in different industries actually care about patent 
term.159 This is important because it shows us the industries in 
which patent term matters more, and in particular, the 
industries in which patentees might be willing to pay more for 
patent protection. After discussing how these empirical estimates 
were obtained, the Article explains how they can be translated 
into actual differential patent prices. 
A. Measuring How Much Patents Matter Across Industries 
My empirical research focuses on the following basic 
questions: How much do patent applicants and patentees care 
about patent term? On average, do applicants in various 
industries differ in how much they care about term? And if so, 
can we quantify these differences? 
Many scholars have speculated on the industries in which 
patents are believed to be more or less important. For example, 
most scholars believe patent term is particularly important for 
pharmaceuticals because it costs a tremendous amount to develop 
a drug and receive FDA approval,160 but it costs relatively little to 
produce or copy an approved drug.161 Absent patent protection, 
most scholars believe there would be little incentive for 
companies to produce new drugs because they could not charge 
monopoly prices to recoup their fixed costs.162 
                                                                                                     
 159. Infra Part IV.A. See generally Sukhatme & Cramer, supra note 10 
(studying the effects of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) on the speed of patent prosecution in different 
industries). 
 160. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The 
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 151, 181 (2003) (estimating that a drug whose research and development 
was started in 2001, with approval twelve years later, would have preapproval 
capitalized costs of $1.9 billion). 
 161. See Joan Costa-Font, Alistair McGuire & Nebibe Varol, Price 
Regulation and Relative Delays in Generic Drug Adoption, J. HEALTH ECON. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1) (noting that generic drugs are cheaper to 
produce than branded products) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 162. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical 
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Regarding other industries, scholars have concluded patents 
are less important, or even harmful. For example, many scholars 
have suggested that patents are unnecessary in the context of 
software.163 They assert that new software can be produced at 
relatively low fixed cost.164 They also claim most software 
becomes obsolete in a short period of time, and hence patent 
protection (or at least a long patent term) is unnecessary to 
incentivize innovation.165 
Much of the conventional wisdom on the relative importance 
of patent term might be correct, but it has remained virtually 
untested. In other words, while scholars might believe patents 
are more or less important to applicants in particular industries, 
there has been little empirical evidence to back these assertions. 
My empirical work seeks to test the conventional wisdom. To 
do this, I take advantage of a natural experiment: the ratification 
by the United States of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) on December 8, 1994.166 
As discussed below, I use this natural experiment to measure 
how much patent applicants care about patent term within 
particular industries.167 I also derive a related measure using 
                                                                                                     
Competition Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 245, 257 (2012) (indicating that, absent patent protection, firms may 
be incentivized to copy old drugs rather than develop new drugs). But see 
Boldrin & Levine, supra note 13, at 13–14 (pointing out that the first-mover 
advantage in drugs might be larger than conventionally realized and that some 
combination of public funding and a reward system could replace the patent 
system). 
 163. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against 
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related 
Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1025–26 (1990) (questioning the need for 
software patents); cf. Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 143, at 906–10 (arguing 
against awarding patent protection for certain business method patents). 
 164. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 14, at 1687 (“Software inventions tend 
to have a quick, cheap, and fairly straightforward post-invention development 
cycle.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Peter Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer 
Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1365, 1371 (1986) (arguing that operating 
systems and application programs should receive shorter patent terms). 
 166. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 17, 19, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 167. Infra Part IV.A.1. In another research project, I use a separate natural 
experiment related to TRIPS to measure the stock market value of additional 
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data on maintenance fees.168 I discuss both measures in turn 
below. 
1. Patent Applicant Behavior Post-TRIPS 
TRIPS was a landmark agreement that changed how patent 
term was calculated for the first time in over 130 years.169 Before 
TRIPS, a patent had a fixed, seventeen-year term that began 
from the date the patent was granted by the PTO.170 The date an 
inventor filed his patent application did not influence the length 
of term he received. 
After TRIPS, however, patent term became twenty years 
from the date the application was filed.171 So post-TRIPS, the 
prosecution time of an application reduced the total term a 
patentee would receive. Accordingly, TRIPS created an incentive 
                                                                                                     
years of patent term. In addition to changing patent term prospectively, TRIPS 
also retroactively changed the term of already-existing patents based on their 
previous prosecution time. In particular, TRIPS gave patentees of already-
issued but not-expired patents the greater of (a) their current term (which was 
awarded under the old rules) and (b) the term the patentee would have received 
under the new rules. See id. at § 154(c)(1) (adjusting term on outstanding 
patents). I take advantage of this unanticipated term increase by testing how 
much publicly traded firms’ stock market values increased based on the total 
amount of additional term those firms received. 
 168. Infra Part IV.A.2. This measure is not related to TRIPS. 
 169. See The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, PATENTLENS, http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/415.html (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
TRIPS also changed some rules on establishing an invention date and allowed 
term extensions in some limited circumstances involving patent interference 
proceedings, secrecy orders, or successful appellate reviews. Additionally, TRIPS 
generated a new type of patent application known as a provisional patent 
application, which is a simplified application that establishes a priority date for 
an applicant. See Sukhatme & Cramer, supra note 10, at 34 (discussing 
provisional patent applications). In my empirical paper, I address each of these 
changes and explain why they do not confound my results. 
 170. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) 
(2012)) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . for the term of 
seventeen years . . . .”). 
 171. See id. § 154(a)(2) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on the 
date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent was filed . . . .”). 
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to speed up patent prosecution because prosecution time would 
now eat into total patent term.172 
My hypothesis is simple: an applicant who especially cares 
about patent term is more likely to speed up prosecution post-
TRIPS as compared to an applicant who cares less about patent 
term. Put differently, industries in which term is more important 
will see average prosecution time decrease more than industries 
in which term is less important. So by measuring how much 
applicants sped up patent prosecution across different industry 
groups, we can get a relative sense of how much they value 
patent term. 
It is not that easy, however, to measure applicant delay 
during patent prosecution. This is because prosecution is a back-
and-forth process between the applicant and the PTO, so total 
prosecution time depends both on applicant delay and PTO delay. 
To illustrate, after an applicant files his application, the ball is in 
the PTO’s court. The applicant then waits for the PTO to issue an 
office action, in which the agency either accepts or rejects the 
patent claims.173 If the applicant receives a rejection, he usually 
has three months to respond to the office action, though he can 
pay a fee and request an extension (which is almost always 
granted) to extend his response time to six months.174 
So to accurately measure applicant delay, one must parse out 
prosecution time that is attributable to the applicant versus time 
                                                                                                     
 172. David Abrams wrote what appears to be the only other paper that uses 
TRIPS as a natural experiment. David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? 
An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1613, 1613–17 (2009). He suggested patent classes with shorter average 
pendencies (i.e., time between application filing and issuance) would benefit 
disproportionately from the change in law because they would receive longer 
patent term extensions on average after TRIPS. See id. at 1635 (“This indicates 
that patent classes with longer extensions due to TRIPS tended to have a 
greater increase in patents following TRIPS than those classes with shorter 
extensions.”). 
 173. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2013) (describing the actions an examiner may 
take). 
 174. See id. § 1.134 (“Unless the applicant is notified in writing that a reply 
is required in less than six months, a maximum period of six months is 
allowed.”); id. § 1.136(a) (stating that applicant may request to extend the time 
period to reply if the original time period was less than the maximum period set 
by statute). 
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attributable to the PTO. I accomplish this by looking at detailed 
transaction histories for 331,162 issued patents filed in 1994 
through 1996. These histories, which chronicle every major event 
during prosecution, allow me to parse out measures of applicant 
delay, such as the amount of time an applicant takes to respond 
to an office action, the number of extensions requested by an 
applicant, and the amount of time an applicant takes to pay an 
issue fee once he receives a notice of allowance.175 
After generating these measures, I test how they changed 
before and after TRIPS within different industry categories, 
which lets me assess the relative importance of patent term 
across industries. For example, if applicants in industry X 
respond to TRIPS by speeding up their office action responses 
more (or requesting fewer extensions) than applicants in industry 
Y, that suggests patent term is more important in industry X 
than in industry Y. Additionally, I compare these measures with 
one another and perform numerous robustness checks, and I find 
my results are consistent across specifications.176 
The first column of Table 1 (titled “Coeff”) in the Appendix 
shows the results from one of my specifications.177 This column 
shows how applicants within particular industry subcategories178 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Sukhatme & Cramer, supra note 10, § 3 (conducting a statistical 
analysis based on these factors). 
 176. Details on these robustness checks are in the full empirical paper, but 
just to give an example, one might be concerned that some applicants might 
have anticipated the passage of TRIPS and changed their prosecuting behavior, 
which could skew measures of applicant delay. To address this selection 
concern, in some specifications I exclude data in certain “inner windows” around 
the enactment of TRIPS, such as applications filed in 1995 or applications filed 
between December, 8, 1994 (the date TRIPS was enacted) and June 8, 1995 (the 
date TRIPS went into effect). Id. at 28. Results generally remain similar and 
significant across these specifications. See id. at 28–31 (showing results). 
 177. Infra Table 1. 
 178. When a patent is filed, it is assigned to a patent class by the PTO. The 
industry subcategories shown here are higher-level groupings of these patent 
classes. The subcategories were generated for a National Bureau of Economics 
Research database. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, 
The NBER Patent Citation Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological 
Tools 414–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001) 
(discussing the creation of the patent categories and subcategories). 
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changed their prosecution speed after TRIPS went into effect.179 
A negative value indicates that applicants in an industry sped up 
prosecution on average after TRIPS; a positive value indicates 
that they slowed down prosecution. 
To illustrate, we see a coefficient of “−5.22” for the 
“Information Storage” subcategory.180 This coefficient suggests 
these applicants sped up patent prosecution, on average, by about 
5.22 days post-TRIPS. Compare that to “Drugs,” which has a 
coefficient of −8.55.181 This coefficient is significantly more 
negative, which suggests that applicants in this industry sped up 
prosecution more than those in “Information Storage.” 
Notice that almost all the coefficients in column 1 are 
negative.182 This is what we predicted—because prosecution time 
reduces patent term after TRIPS, applicants will generally speed 
up prosecution.183 Also notice the subcategories with statistically 
significant coefficients in which patent applicants sped up the 
most are the following:184 
Genetics (−25.75) 
Drugs (−8.55) 
Semiconductor Devices (−7.36) 
Electronic Business Methods and Software (−6.39) 
Information Storage (−5.22) 
                                                                                                     
 179. TRIPS went into effect on June 8, 1995, six months after it was ratified. 
The main independent variable I use in my regressions is a dummy variable 
that takes the value “1” if the patent application was filed post-TRIPS (on or 
after June 8, 1995) and “0” if the application was filed pre-TRIPS (before June 8, 
1995). The Post-TRIPS coefficient is the ordinary least squares coefficient on 
this variable. It measures how much applicants sped up after TRIPS. 
 180. Infra Table 1. 
 181. Infra Table 1. 
 182. Infra Table 1. 
 183. Mark Lemley first made this prediction in a paper he wrote twenty 
years ago. See Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent 
Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 386–87 (1994) (hypothesizing that patent attorneys 
will be pressured to file responses to office actions more quickly and therefore 
reduce the prosecution time on patent applications). My empirical paper is the 
first to apportion prosecution time between the applicant and the PTO; it is 
therefore the first paper to test (and confirm) his prediction. See Sukhatme & 
Cramer, supra note 10, at 2 (overviewing methods used). 
 184.  Infra Table 1. See also Sukhatme & Cramer, supra note 10, at tbls.6–7. 
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Computers—Hardware and Software (−5.03) 
Resins (−4.99) 
Communications (−4.87) 
Organic Compounds (−4.86) 
Computer Peripherals (−4.17) 
Power Systems (−2.51) 
Miscellaneous Chemicals (−2.40) 
Many of these results support the conventional wisdom. For 
example, it is not surprising that two prominent pharmaceutical-
related subcategories (“Genetics” and “Drugs”), chemical 
subcategories (“Resins” and “Organic Chemicals”) and 
“Semiconductor Devices” were among the groups in which 
inventors sped up prosecution the most. More surprising is the 
presence of “Electronic Business Methods and Software,” 
“Information Storage,” and “Computer—Hardware and Software” 
as the subcategories with the fourth-, fifth- and sixth-fastest 
speed-ups in prosecution, respectively. That applicants in these 
fields responded more to TRIPS suggests inventors of new 
software products and business methods might care more about 
patent term than was previously appreciated. 
2. Maintenance Fee Measure 
  There are other empirical measures of patent value that do 
not rely on natural experiments. The second column of Table 1 
(titled “Mtd”) presents such a measure based on maintenance fee 
payments.185 As discussed previously, maintenance fees must be 
paid by a patentee to prevent a patent from lapsing.186 The 
measure presented here is the percentage of patentees within an 
industry category who maintain their patents through the last 
maintenance fee payment, due eleven-and-a-half years after 
patent issuance. In other words, column two reports the 
                                                                                                     
 185. Infra Table 1. 
 186. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (discussing maintenance 
fees). 
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percentage of patents within industry subcategories whose patent 
term did not end early for failure to pay maintenance fees.187 
I use this maintenance fee measure as another way to 
compare the relative value of patents across industries.188 The 
idea is that if a patentee pays a maintenance fee, we can infer he 
believes the discounted expected benefit from keeping the patent 
alive exceeds the present cost of the maintenance fee. If more 
patents are renewed in certain industries relative to others, we 
can conclude patent term is, on average, more valuable in those 
industries. For example, if pharmaceutical patents are more 
likely to be maintained on average than mechanical patents, then 
we might believe that pharmaceutical patents are on average 
more valuable than mechanical patents. 
Of course, there are limitations to this approach because 
patents that are maintained are only the ones near the top end of 
the patent value distribution—those patents whose value exceeds 
the maintenance fee threshold amount. Conclusions drawn from 
maintenance fees might not hold true for less valuable patents 
within an industry.189 Nonetheless, cross-industry renewal rates 
offer some insight as to the average patent value within those 
industries. 
Looking at Table 1, we can see that subcategories with 
renewal rates greater than 50% are the following:190 
                                                                                                     
 187. Infra Table 1. 
 188. Other scholars have also used data on maintenance fee payments as a 
proxy for patent value. See Jean O. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes & Jonathan Putnam, 
How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent 
Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 405, 407 (1998) (noting that 
because “patent rights are seldom marketed, application and renewal data are 
one of the few sources of information on the value of patent protection 
available”); Mark Schankerman, How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates 
by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77, 78 (1998) (“Under the assumption 
that patentees make a profit-maximizing renewal decision, data on patent 
renewal rates and fees can be used to infer the private value of patent 
protection.”). 
 189. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit & Jillian Popadak, Patent 
Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?, 27 (PIER 
Working Paper 13-065, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2351809 (finding an inverted-U relationship 
between forward citations and patent value). 
 190. Infra Table 1. Based on percentage of issued patents filed in 1994–1996 
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Electronic Business Methods and Software (64.6%) 
Semiconductor Devices (63.8%) 
Computer Peripherals (62.7%) 
Genetics (61.7%) 
Computers ― Hardware and Software (60.7%) 
Communications (60.7%) 
Information Storage (60.4%) 
Surgery & Medical Instruments (57.8%) 
Miscellaneous Electronics (57.0%) 
Miscellaneous Drugs and Medical (53.5%) 
Power Systems (53.0%) 
Nuclear & X-rays (51.8%) 
Electrical Devices (51.7%) 
Resins (50.6%) 
Optics (50.1%) 
We can see significant overlap between the subcategories 
here and the ones where patent applicants sped up prosecution 
the most after TRIPS. For example, “Genetics,” “Semiconductor 
Devices,” and “Electronic Business Methods and Software,” rank 
highly under both measures.191 This overlap suggests the two 
measures are capturing a real effect and that patent term indeed 
matters more in these subcategories.192 
3. Industry-Level PTO Costs 
The discussion here has thus far focused primarily on 
patentees: how much does patent term matter to patentees in 
different industries? A related, important question relates to the 
                                                                                                     
and maintained through eleven-and-a-half years. See Sukhatme & Cramer, 
supra note 10, at tbls.6–7.  
 191. Infra Table 1. 
 192. One can also run quantitative tests to confirm the two measures are 
highly correlated. In my paper, I use more advanced empirical methodologies 
(including one technique known as difference-in-differences estimation) and 
multiple controls to confirm the correlation between the two measures. See 
Sukhatme & Cramer, supra note 10, § 5 (using a difference-in-differences 
analysis to test the relationship between patent renewal rates and changes in 
applicant delay due to TRIPS). 
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PTO: does it cost more for the PTO to examine certain types of 
applications as compared to others? 
It turns out it does. In particular, the PTO allocates a certain 
number of hours for patent examiners to review applications 
within different technology groups.193 In a recent empirical piece, 
Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman generated examiner 
hour estimates for the same industry subcategories I have 
discussed throughout this section.194 These hour estimates are 
shown in column 3 of Table 1 (titled “Hours”).195 
Looking at these estimates, we can identify the subcategories 
that cost the PTO the most in terms of examiner hours spent 
reviewing applications. In particular, here are the subcategories 
for which the PTO allocates more than twenty hours of 
application review time:196 
Electronic Business Methods and Software (27.4) 
Genetics (24.8) 
Computers—Hardware and Software (23.4) 
Computer Peripherals (21.9) 
Gas (21.7) 
Coating (20.9) 
Semiconductor Devices (20.6) 
It is striking that the subcategories here are largely the same 
ones that topped the previous two lists in this section. In other 
words, the subcategories in which applicants care the most about 
patent protection are the same as the subcategories that cost the 
PTO the most in terms of application review time. 
The overlap between these measures further bolsters the 
case for differential pricing. As discussed earlier, it makes sense 
                                                                                                     
 193. See Frakes & Wasserman, Failed Promise, supra note 11, app. A, at 9 
(noting that the PTO assigns a certain amount of hours to examine a patent 
depending on the technology group a patent is in and the examiner’s pay grade). 
 194. See id; Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting Patterns, supra note 11, 
app. A, at 135–36 tbl.A1 (listing technology categories). In particular, these 
authors showed how many hours were allocated to an examiner to review a 
patent application within each of the same thirty-seven subcategories I use 
here. Id. 
 195. Infra Table 1. 
 196. Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting Patterns, supra note 11, app. A, 
at 135–36 tbl.A1. 
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for the PTO to use its regulatory monopoly status to charge 
higher fees to: (1) applicants who value patent protection more; 
and (2) applicants for whom examination takes more time by the 
PTO. The above discussion tells us that these two groups are 
often in fact the same ones.197 In other words, the subcategories 
in which applicants care more about patent protection are the 
same ones that have more costly applications to review.198 
B. Generating Differential Patent Prices 
The previous section showed two independent ways of 
measuring patent term sensitivity, which informed us of the 
relative importance of patent term across industries.199 
Additionally, we saw how the subcategories in which applicants 
cared the most about patent term were the same subcategories 
with applications that cost the PTO the most to review.200 
Next, we can use our patent sensitivity measures to generate 
differential patent prices. In particular, as described in Part III, 
the optimal approach likely involves scaling the third 
maintenance fee (due at eleven-and-a-half years) by the 
applicants’ measured desire for patent protection. There are a 
number of ways in which differential prices could be generated 
but I focus on two examples presently.201 
                                                                                                     
 197. Calculation of correlation coefficients confirms these measures are 
related. 
 198. Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman also develop a more 
complicated measure of examination costs by subcategory. See Frakes & 
Wasserman, Failed Promise, supra note 11, app. A, at 9–11 (detailing 
construction of examination cost measure). This measure accounts for examiner 
salaries and the distribution of GS pay grades across subcategories. Id. The 
relative ranking of subcategories under either the hours-spent measure (as 
shown in column 3 of Table 1) or the Frakes–Wasserman cost measure is almost 
identical, and both correlate with my applicant delay and maintenance fee 
measures. Compare Table 1 (measuring change in patent prosecution delays and 
percent of patents maintained), with Frakes & Wasserman, Failed Promise, 
supra note 11, app. A, at 135–36 tbl.A1 (measuring examination costs by 
technology). 
 199. Supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
 200. Supra Part IV.A.3. 
 201. The fees discussed in this subpart are the default ones for large entity 
patentees; as noted, small entities and micro-entities pay one-half and one-
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First, one simple way to generate prices would be to use the 
desired measure itself to scale the eleven-and-a-half year 
maintenance fee. This could be done for all the industries, or just 
a subset of them. For example, one could increase maintenance 
fees only on applicants in industries that had a significant 
negative coefficient on the “Post-TRIPS” measure described in 
Part III.A.1. In other words, fees would increase only on 
patentees in the twelve subcategories with significant negative 
coefficients because those applicants responded the most to the 
change in patent term instituted by TRIPS.202 
How large should this fee increase be? One straightforward 
approach would be to generate the increase based on the 
deviation of the relevant coefficient from zero. To illustrate, 
“Communications” has a coefficient of −4.87; hence, we could 
increase maintenance fees in “Communications” by 4.87% relative 
to the current maintenance fee of $7,400.203 Column 1 of Table 2 
(titled “Prop 1”) shows the proposed increases under this 
approach. As one can see, it involves only modest increases, with 
a maximum increase of just $1,906 for “Genetics.”204 
This approach could also be altered to accommodate larger 
fee increases. For example, suppose the PTO calculates 
differential prices based on the second measure described in the 
previous section—the percentage of applicants within industry 
subcategories who maintained patents through eleven-and-a-half 
years (values in column 2 of Table 1, titled “Mtd”).205 
Subcategories with more maintained patents will have patentees 
who typically care more about patent protection. That is, their 
                                                                                                     
quarter of these fees, respectively. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2012) (setting forth the 
fees charged to small entities). 
 202. Infra Table 1. 
 203. Infra Table 1; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2013) (setting the current 
maintenance fee). 
 204. Infra Table 2. 
 205. See supra Part IV.A.2 (arguing that patentees in industries that tend to 
maintain patents through eleven-and-a-half years generally value patent 
protection more than patentees in industries that do not maintain patents for 
the same time period). 
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demand for patents is likely to be more inelastic, so individuals in 
those subcategories could be charged higher maintenance fees.206 
To illustrate how this approach might be implemented, 
suppose the PTO decides to keep the eleven-and-a-half year 
maintenance fee at $7,400 for applicants in the subcategory with 
the lowest renewal rate (“Furniture and House Fixtures,” which 
only has a 27.94% renewal rate) but increases fees 
proportionately for everyone else. Then, for example, “Electrical 
Device” patentees, who have a 51.65% renewal rate, would see 
their fees increase by 23.71% (51.65% minus 27.94%), and 
“Organics Compound” patentees, who have a renewal rate of 
44.30%, would see their fees increase by 16.36% (44.30% minus 
27.94%).207 This approach would yield a fee schedule as shown in 
the second column of Table 2 (titled “Prop 2”).208 The fee increases 
in Proposal 2 cover all subcategories of inventions and are larger, 
ranging up to an increase of $2,711 for “Electronic Business 
Methods and Software.”209 
The approaches described here are flexible and could be 
altered in a number of ways. For example, instead of targeting 
maintenance fees at the subcategory level, one could tailor them 
at the broader category level (i.e., the six categories of 
“Chemicals,” “Drugs and Medical,” “Others,” “Electrical,” 
“Computers and Communications,” and “Mechanical”).210 
                                                                                                     
 206. See ELASTICITY ESTIMATES, supra note 115, at 1 (explaining that 
inelastic demand means that consumers are generally indifferent to changes in 
price). 
 207. Infra Table 1. 
 208. Infra Table 2. 
 209. Infra Table 2. The proposals here show how the PTO could use 
differential maintenance fees to charge more to patentees who care more about 
patent term. As discussed in Part III.E above, differential patent pricing could 
also be used to limit patent term by increasing maintenance fees to such a 
degree that few patentees renew their patents. For example, to limit patent 
term on “Optics” to three-and-a-half years, the PTO could increase the 
three-and-a-half year patent term by some large value (e.g., a ten-fold increase) 
to effectively limit term for most “Optics” patentees. 
 210. One might be concerned about patentees “gaming” the system by 
writing their applications in such a way as to take advantage of lower fees. 
Differentially pricing along larger category boundaries would make this more 
difficult. For example, an inventor might be able to frame his application as an 
“Information Storage” invention instead of a “Computer—Hardware and 
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Alternatively, fees could be set at the finer patent class level, 
which is determined by the PTO when a patent application is 
filed. 
Still, it is apparent there is some guesswork in the tailoring 
of maintenance fees. In particular, it might not always be clear 
whether fee adjustments are too high or too low for a particular 
subcategory. Fortunately, this concern is surmountable because 
differential patent prices can be adjusted over time. If, for 
example, the PTO notices that patentees severely decrease the 
number of patents renewed in response to a modest increase in 
maintenance fees, then that suggests the increase in 
maintenance fees was too much. On the other hand, if patentees 
barely respond to the increase in maintenance fees—if they 
maintain their patents at approximately the same rate as 
before—then that suggests a further increase in maintenance fees 
might be appropriate. Accordingly, the PTO has significant 
ability to tweak prices as needed to ensure it achieves its goals of 
increasing revenue and incentivizing innovation. 
V. The Legal Basis for Differential Patent Pricing 
This Article thus far has shown how differential pricing could 
improve social welfare, and how such prices might be set across 
different industry categories. The present Part discusses the legal 
authority for the PTO to set such prices. In particular, the Article 
explains how many of the changes specified above could be 
implemented by the PTO using newly gained fee-setting 
authority under the America Invents Act of 2011. 
A. The America Invents Act and the PTO’s Fee-Setting Authority 
Until recently, the PTO had little control over the fees it 
charged patent applicants or patentees. Filing fees, maintenance 
fees, or other fees owed to the PTO were set by statute, and any 
                                                                                                     
Software” invention to avoid higher maintenance fees in the latter subcategory. 
But it would be much harder for him to frame his application such that it falls 
outside the broader, “Computer and Communications” category. 
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change to these fees needed to be approved by Congress.211 
Moreover, since 1991, Congress has effectively required the PTO 
to fund itself through these user fees.212 
This situation was problematic. If the PTO must fund itself 
but has no control over what it can charge, then as its workload 
increases, it might take extraordinary measures to ensure it 
stays within budget. Indeed, Michael Frakes and Melissa 
Wasserman recently suggested that the PTO did this by granting 
more patents in areas that tended to have higher renewal rates 
(and hence, more maintenance fees to collect),213 and by 
prioritizing patent applications in technologies that are quicker to 
review (and hence, allowing the PTO to churn through 
applications quicker and earn more fees).214 
Things changed in 2011, when the PTO was given fee-setting 
authority with the passage of the America Invents Act (AIA).215 
The AIA was the culmination of years of scholarly and legislative 
debate on patent reform. It resulted in numerous changes to the 
patent system, most notably a shift from a first-to-invent to a 
first-to-file system of patent priority, so a patent application filing 
date and not the actual invention date is now what determines 
                                                                                                     
 211. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (setting fees for patent applications). 
 212. See Frakes & Wasserman, PTO’s Granting Patterns, supra note 11, at 
76 (discussing the funding of the PTO through user fees). 
 213. See id. at 102–05 (finding their results are consistent with the general 
prediction that the PTO would more likely grant patents in categories with a 
high maintenance fee renewal rate). The PTO recently disputed this assertion, 
claiming that higher renewal rates in particular industries have no effect on its 
patent granting decisions. See Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 
4211, 4251 (Jan. 18, 2013) (“[T]he Office’s fee schedule and financial positions 
are not the drivers of patent examination practice . . . .  [P]atent examiners 
make independent patentability determinations in accordance with statutory 
requirements by comparing the prior art to the claimed invention as a whole, 
without regard to budgetary pressures of the USPTO.”). 
 214. See Frakes & Wasserman, Failed Promise, supra note 11, at 5 (finding 
that when the PTO is in financial difficulty, it begins to give “preferential 
examination-queuing treatment to those technologies that cost the Agency the 
least to examine”). 
 215. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 
284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (giving the PTO limited 
fee-setting authority). 
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who has priority among different inventors who claim the same 
invention.216 
More importantly for our purposes, the AIA gave the PTO 
control over the fees it charges. The most important AIA 
provision relevant to fee-setting is § 10(a), which allows the PTO 
to “set or adjust by rule any fee” for patent-related services or 
materials provided by the PTO, so long as any such change is 
used “to recover the aggregate estimated costs to the Office for 
processing, activities, services, and materials relating to 
patents.”217 In other words, the PTO can alter its fees, but the 
changes must be related to the PTO’s actual costs—the goal is for 
the PTO to have sufficient flexibility to take care of its own 
expenses, not to turn it into a money-making machine. 
Moreover, § 10(d) of the AIA specified procedures the PTO 
must take before it can exercise its fee-setting authority. First, 
the PTO Director must submit a proposed fee to the nine-member 
Patent Public Advisory Committee, which was first created by the 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999.218 The Director must 
engage the Committee at least forty-five days before publishing 
the proposed rule and ensure the Committee has thirty days to 
                                                                                                     
 216. The AIA also eliminated patent interferences, which were proceedings 
used by the PTO to determine priority between different inventors. Id. §§ 134, 
145, 146, 154, 305. Additionally, the AIA gave outside parties the ability to 
challenge patents in the PTO for up to nine months after the patent issues. Id. 
§ 321. 
 217. 35 U.S.C. § 41(d)(1)(A). The full provision as it relates to patents states: 
(a) FEE SETTING 
(1) IN GENERAL. The Director may set or adjust by rule any fee 
established, authorized, or charged under title 35, United States 
Code, . . . for any services performed by or materials furnished by, the 
Office, subject to paragraph (2). 
(2) FEES TO RECOVER COSTS. Fees may be set or adjusted under 
paragraph (1) only to recover the aggregate estimated costs to the 
Office for processing, activities, services, and materials relating to 
patents (in the case of patent fees) . . . including administrative costs 
of the Office with respect to such patent . . . fees (as the case may be). 
Id. 
 218. See 35 U.S.C. § 5(a) (establishing the Advisory Committee). The 
Committee is selected by the Secretary of Commerce and consists of individuals 
“chosen so as to represent the interests of diverse users of the [PTO] with 
respect to patents.” Id. § 5(b). 
1916 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855 (2014) 
consider the fee proposal.219 The Committee must hold a public 
hearing during this thirty-day period and produce a public 
written report of its comments, advice, and recommendations, 
which the Director must then consider.220 
If the Director decides to proceed with the fee change, she 
must notify Congress (via the Chair and Ranking Member of the 
Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives) about the proposed change and publish the 
proposed fee in the Federal Register, describing its rationale and 
possible benefits.221 After a public comment period of at least 
forty-five days, the Director can then publish a final rule in the 
Federal Register and Official Gazette of the PTO.222 Absent a 
congressional override, the new fee can then go into effect at “the 
end of the forty-five day period beginning on the day after the 
date” on which the final rule was published.223 
Section 10(c) of the AIA also gave the PTO the ability to 
reduce fees in certain fiscal years, provided the PTO Director 
consults with the Patent Public Advisory Committee on the 
advisability of reducing these fees first.224 So the Director does 
not have to go through the general notice and comment procedure 
described in the paragraphs above if the change is just a 
reduction in fees. 
B. Differential Patent Pricing Under the AIA 
There is good reason to believe the PTO can use its § 10 
authority to set differential patent prices across industry 
categories. Although the statute mandates certain pre-fee-setting 
procedures, it gives the PTO a great deal of flexibility in actually 
                                                                                                     
 219. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(d)(1), 
(2)(A), 1245 Stat. 284, 317 (2011) (requiring the Committee’s input on fee 
changes). 
 220. See id. § 10(d)(2)(B), (d)(3), (d)(4) (providing notice and comment 
proceedings for proposed fee changes). 
 221. See id. § 10(e)(4) (implementing notification requirements for fee 
changes). 
 222. See id. § 10(e)(3) (providing public hearing for fee changes). 
 223. Id. § 10(e)(4)(A). 
 224. See id. § 10(c) (allowing for fee reductions in certain fiscal years). 
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setting the fees. Indeed, the PTO has the final say over what fees 
are implemented. 
In particular, the statute allows the agency to set or adjust 
any fee to recover its aggregate estimated patent-related costs.225 
There is no requirement that each PTO technology group or 
division subsist on its own budget; rather, the agency is free to 
choose fees and reallocate funds to best enable it to meet its 
aggregate expected patent-related costs. 
Additionally, the PTO has already recognized its ability to 
use fee setting to promote innovation. For example, when the 
PTO first exercised its new fee-setting authority in 2013, it noted, 
“To encourage innovators to take advantage of patent protection, 
the Office sets basic ‘front-end’ fees (e.g., filing, search, and 
examination) below the actual cost of carrying out these 
activities.”226 Differential patent pricing on maintenance fees is 
merely a more efficient way for the PTO to do what it already 
does: increase back-end revenues to subsidize lower front-end 
fees.227 
                                                                                                     
 225. See id. § 10(a)(2) (“Fees may be set or adjusted . . . only to recover the 
aggregate estimated costs to the Office . . . .”). 
 226. Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4211, 4216 (Jan. 18, 
2013). The Patent Public Advisory Committee also recognized that the AIA 
grants the PTO power to shape patent applicant behavior through fee 
structuring. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY 
COMM. FEE SETTING REPORT 6 (2012), http://www.uspto.gov/aia_ 
implementation/120924-ppac-fee-setting-report2.pdf (“Within the ambit of 
overall aggregate revenue recovery, the AIA allows the USPTO to set individual 
fees at levels to encourage or discourage behaviors by applicants.”). 
 227. One potential concern with industry-specific tailoring relates to a 
provision in TRIPS, which prohibits member states from discriminating in 
granting patents based on technology type. See Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 27, PATENTLENS, http://www.patentlens.net/ 
daisy/patentlens/415.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (“[P]atents shall be 
available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of 
invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This provision, 
however, has never been carefully followed by the United States or the 
European Union. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 131, at 97. For example, the 
United States has passed numerous industry-specific statutes, particularly in 
relation to pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and semiconductors. See id. at 95–96 
(citing nine industry-specific U.S. statutes, including 35 U.S.C. §§  155, 156 
(2000) (lengthening term for most pharmaceutical patents); 35 U.S.C. §  103(b) 
(2000) (relaxing obviousness standard for biotechnological processes); 17 U.S.C. 
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Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV.A.3 above, the industry 
subcategories in which patentees care more about patent 
protection correspond quite closely to the subcategories that cost 
the PTO the most in terms of examiner resources. So differential 
maintenance fees can also be justified as a way to deal with 
differential costs across industry subcategories. For example, a 
higher maintenance fee on the “Genetics” subcategory is justified 
not only because applicants in that category generally care more 
about patent protection (and hence are likely to pay more for 
patent protection) but also because it costs the PTO more to 
review a “Genetics” application. So increasing the back-end fees 
charged to “Genetics” patentees takes into account that these 
individuals are imposing higher costs on the PTO in the first 
place. 
Although the PTO can likely use its § 10 authority to 
differentially price maintenance fees across industries, it is less 
clear whether it could use the same authority to differentially 
limit patent term. As discussed in Part III.E.2 above, the PTO 
could effectively limit patent term on an industry-by-industry 
basis by greatly increasing maintenance fees for patentees in 
some industries. This sort of policy would not be an attempt by 
the PTO to generate revenue to reduce other costs;228 rather, such 
an increase would further the direct policy objective of limiting 
excess term in some industry categories. It seems likely that such 
an increase would be too much of a stretch of the PTO’s § 10 
authority.229 Hence, further congressional action might be 
                                                                                                     
§  901-14 (2000) (Semiconductor Chip Protection Act)). Indeed, TRIPS has never 
been enforced against countries for enacting industry-specific statutes, and as a 
practical matter, modest tailoring like the customized maintenance fees 
described here seems likely to be compatible with TRIPS. See id.; see also Roin, 
supra note 14, at 706 n.155 (suggesting industry-specific patent terms would not 
violate TRIPS); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying 
Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 
13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 453 (2007). 
 228. Indeed, unless current maintenance fees are tremendously underpriced, 
one might expect a very large increase in maintenance fees would end up 
decreasing PTO revenues. 
 229. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 226, at 6 
As a policy matter, the PPAC advised that while some use of fees to 
encourage or discourage behavior may be appropriate, significant use 
of this ability to set fees at very high levels to discourage actions is 
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necessary before the PTO could greatly increase maintenance 
fees as a way to effectively limit patent term.230 
Even if such legislation is required, however, that has no 
impact on the benefits of limiting patent term in the manner 
described here. In particular, recognizing that increasing patent 
maintenance fees is a more flexible way to differentially limit 
term is an insight that policymakers should remember if they 
ever seek to institute industry-specific patent terms. 
VI. Conclusion 
There is a hidden monopoly that lies dormant within many 
regulatory bodies. This Article tries to shed light on that 
monopoly and reveal its power to conduct differential pricing. In 
particular, the Article describes the economic factors that give 
regulatory monopolists the ability to price regulatory “goods” 
differentially and explains how these monopolies can use such 
pricing to enhance social welfare. 
The Article proceeds to apply these concepts to the market 
for patents. The PTO is a quintessential regulatory monopoly, 
with the sole power to provide a regulatory good (i.e., patent 
rights) and set related prices (i.e., patent fees). The Article 
explains how the PTO could differentially price patents across 
industries to increase revenues and promote innovation. 
Additionally, it describes how differential pricing of maintenance 
fees provides a flexible way to achieve a policy goal sought by 
many scholars: the customization of patent terms across 
industries. 
                                                                                                     
not recommended because it is not clear that the USPTO will always 
take into consideration the factors driving applicants to certain 
behaviors, which may be at cross-purposes with particular desires of 
the USPTO. 
 230. If a huge increase in maintenance fees were applied to already-issued 
patents, there might also be an argument that this increase constitutes a 
regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (stating that a 
regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial uses of 
her property constitutes a regulatory taking). 
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The Article then details my recent empirical work, which 
provides the foundation for setting differential patent prices. In 
particular, my research measures the relative importance of 
patent term to applicants and patentees in different industries. I 
approach this question from different empirical angles and find 
consistency in my results. This consistency provides comfort that 
we have indeed identified the industries in which patent term is 
more important. Using these results, I then generate examples of 
differential pricing structures. 
The last section of the Article describes the legal framework 
for differential pricing. Namely, it describes how the AIA—the 
recent manifestation of a years-long push toward patent reform—
empowers the PTO to set different prices for patentees in 
different industries. 
Differential pricing is not necessarily easy to implement, nor 
is it always desirable. Nonetheless, regulatory monopolies would 
do well to recognize that such pricing can be a powerful tool that 
enables agencies to better fulfill their regulatory goals. This is 
particularly true in the market for patents, where differential 
pricing has the potential to make the U.S. patent system better at 
achieving its core purpose: Incentivizing innovation. 
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VII. Appendix 
Table 1: Post-TRIPS Coefficients, Percent of Patents Maintained, 
and Examination Hours Allocated by PTO Across Subcategories231 
Category  Coeff Mtd Hrs Category  Coeff Mtd Hrs 
Chemicals Mechanical    
Agriculture, Food, 
Textiles   −2.00 36.7 19.3 
Material Proc. & 
Handling    1.11 41.4 19.1 
Coating     1.07 47.8 20.9 Metal Working    0.80 45.9 19.2 
Gas     0.92 44.4 21.7 Motors/Engines  −0.28 45.6 18.4 
Organic Comp.   −4.86*** 44.3 18.8 Optics  −2.20 50.1 17.1 
Resins   −4.99*** 50.6 19.3 Transportation  −1.23 36.2 16.9 
Misc.   −2.40*** 45.9 18.8 Misc.    1.39 41.1 17.9 
        
Drugs & Med.    Comp. & Comm.    
Drugs   −8.55*** 48.8 17.2 Communications −4.87*** 60.7 18.9 
Surgery/Med. Inst.     1.65 57.8 15.3 Hard./Software −5.03*** 60.7 23.4 
Genetics −25.75*** 61.7 24.8 Comp. Periph. −4.17*** 62.7 21.9 
Misc.   −1.45 53.5 18.8 Info. Storage −5.22*** 60.4 14.2 
    Elec. Bus. Meth. & Software −6.39*** 64.6 27.4 
Others        
Agric., Husb., Food   −0.61 35.6 18.5 Electrical    
Amuse. Devices     4.50*** 28.6 17.2 Elec. Devices −1.18 51.6 17.8 
Apparel & Textile   −1.90 30.4 17.3 Elec. Lighting −1.40 41.5 18.7 
Earth Work./Wells     1.50 49.5 17.6 Meas. & Testing −1.99* 47.3 17.9 
Furn., House Fix.   −1.02 27.9 16.6 Nuclear & X-rays   0.03 51.8 19.8 
Heating   −1.00 40.5 13.8 Power Systems −2.51** 53.0 18.7 
Pipes & Joints   −0.49 47.8 16.6 Semiconductors  −7.36*** 63.8 20.6 
Receptacles   −1.10 33.0 15.3 Misc. −0.74 57.0 17.6 
Misc.   −0.91 40.9 18.4     
        
   
                                                                                                     
 231. First and second cols. (Coeff and Mtd) are from Neel U. Sukhatme & 
Judd N.L. Cramer, Who Cares About Patent Term? Cross-Industry Differences in 
Term Sensitivity (Princeton Univ. Econ. Dept., Working Paper, 2014) at tbls.6–
7, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293245.  ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1. 
Third col. (Hrs) is from Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does 
Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s 
Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 65 app. A at 135–36 tbl.A1 (2013). 
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Table 2: Proposed Differential Increases for  
11 1/2 Years Maintenance Fee232 
Category  Prop 1 Prop 2 Category  Prop 1 Prop 2 
Chemicals Mechanical   
Agriculture, Food, 
Textiles $0 $645 
Material Proc. & 
Handling $0 $994 
Coating $0 $1,472 Metal Working $0 $1,330  
Gas $0 $1,216 Motors/Engines $0 $1,305  
Organic Comp. $360 $1,211 Optics $0 $1,641  
Resins $369 $1,679 Transportation $0 $610  
Misc. $178 $1,331 Misc. $0 $973  
      
Drugs & Med.   Comp. & Comm.   
Drugs $633 $1,540 Communications $360 $2,423  
Surgery/Med. Inst. $0 $2,210 Hard./Software $372 $2,426  
Genetics $1,906 $2,495 Comp. Periph. $309 $2,572  
Misc. $0 $1,889 Info. Storage $386 $2,403  
   Elec. Bus. Meth. & Software $473 $2,711  
Others      
Agric., Husb., Food $0 $570 Electrical   
Amuse. Devices $0 $52 Elec. Devices $0 $1,755  
Apparel & Textile $0 $181 Elec. Lighting $0 $1,006  
Earth Work./Wells $0 $1,598 Meas. & Testing $0 $1,433  
Furn., House Fix. $0 $0 Nuclear & X-rays $0 $1,767  
Heating $0 $928 Power Systems $186 $1,856  
Pipes & Joints $0 $1,471 Semiconductors  $545 $2,657  
Receptacles $0 $373 Misc. $0 $2,150  
Misc. $0 $958    
      
 
                                                                                                     
 232. The current eleven-and-a-half year maintenance fee is $7,400. 
Proposals above show suggested increases in this fee, by subcategory.  
